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In 1999, Canada participated in NATO’s Operation Allied Force, a 78-day bombing campaign 
against Yugoslavia meant to end the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians. Officially, Canada’s 
interests in developing its foreign policy towards Kosovo were humanitarian and regional 
stability considerations. These were shared with rest of its NATO allies. As such, on the surface, 
it would seem that Canada and its NATO allies had similar concerns during the decision-making 
process around Kosovo. Digging deeper, an analysis of the primary sources reveals that Canada 
did, in fact, have a set of additional and unique considerations during the Kosovo crisis, namely 
national unity and diaspora discontent. This analysis, in turn, amply illustrates how 
interconnected domestic issues and Canadian foreign policy are. During the Kosovo War, 
Canada had to balance the interconnected domestic pressures of diaspora relations and national 
unity with their humanitarian concerns. Understanding Canada’s unique internal pressures, 
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A Note on Identity and Terminology 
Two acknowledgments are necessary in this thesis. The first is an acknowledgment of my 
background. The second is an acknowledgment of the terminology that will be used. Integral to 
the practice of history is the interrogation of how individuals and organizations make both 
conscious and subconscious decisions. Similarly, the interrogation of the conscious and 
subconscious motivations of a historian is also integral to the practice of history. This 
interrogation includes an analysis of prejudices, assumptions, and worldviews as it pertains to 
vocational training, gender, age, political ideology, amongst a host of other considerations. 
Therefore, it would be prudent of me to be transparent about my own background. I am a 
Kosovar Albanian who left Kosovo ten days after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) bombing began on 24 March, 1999.1 I spent time living in a refugee camp in 
Macedonia, and then came to Canada as a refugee. Upon arriving in Canada, I lived at the 
Canadian Forces Base Borden for one month before being settled in Thunder Bay. Although I 
was too young to remember much before immigrating to Canada, memories of the war, 
appreciation for the Canadian and NATO soldiers, and debating politics were integral to my 
upbringing. In addition to my identity as a Kosovar Albanian, I also a believe in a pacifist 
theology. Though I am cautious about these aspects of my identity as an author, I caution against 
too much emphasis being placed on them. As a historian, I am aware of the need to be discerning 
when studying the past.  
The second acknowledgment is an explanatory note on the use of terminology in this 
essay. The majority of books and articles written on the history of Kosovo include explanations 
for their choice of terminology. The name ‘Kosovo’ is the Serbian spelling of the country which 
 
1 I refer to myself as a ‘Kosovar Albanian’ as opposed to the term ‘Kosovo Albanian’ used in the rest of the essay. 




Albanians refer to as ‘Kosova.’ In this essay, except for direct quotations using an alternative 
form, I use the name ‘Kosovo.’ I have chosen to use this spelling as it is the most common 
spelling used in English language publications and is how the Canadian government officially 
references the country in official documents and in Parliament. When referring to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), I use simply ‘Yugoslavia’ or the FRY. When referring to other 
place names I will use the Albanian and the Serbian with a stroke in between. For example, 
Prishtina / Priština. The Albanian is first alphabetically and therefore will come first in the 
writing as well. Whereas, some may see this as pedantic, others like Tim Judah, the author of 
Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know, recognize the necessity of clarifying the nomenclature. 
On the topic of using both languages in writing he explains “[t]his is ungainly, but unless you are 
careful, conspiracy theorists will always sniff out a bias where there is none.”2 If only one place 
name is given, as in the case for Prizren, the spelling is the same in both languages. When 
referring to the inhabitants of Kosovo, I use the terms ‘Kosovo Albanians’ and ‘Kosovo 
Serbians’ as opposed to the many other ways these groups are referenced, such as ‘Albanians,’ 
‘Kosovars,’ and ‘Serbs in Kosovo.’ This is an attempt to both recognize distinct ethnic identities 
while affirming that both are rightful citizens of Kosovo. When referring to individuals, such as 
Milošević, I use the spelling of their names in their native language unless quoting a source 
directly which does not. Judah warns, “[a]nyone who tries to work out a failsafe system on 
names, except if they use just one language or the other, is wasting their time.”3 Despite Judah’s 
warning, I have endeavoured to create a system of names and place names that is fair to all sides 
while also reflecting the literature accurately.  
 
2 Tim Judah, Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), x. 




When referring to the seventy-eight-day NATO bombing campaign against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, I use the term ‘Kosovo War.’ When referring to the escalating problems 
in Kosovo as a whole, I use the term ‘Kosovo crisis.’ Canadian historian and author of Scattering 
Chaff: Canadian Air Power and Censorship during the Kosovo War Bob Bergen points out that 
the Canadian government, the American government, and NATO largely refused to use the term 
‘war’ in 1999. All preferred to use other terms, such as “humanitarian mission,” “air campaign,” 
“bombing campaign,” “conflict,” “military act,” and “intervention.” Alternatively, in the House 
of Commons, opposition parties called it a “war” and pressed the Liberal government on the 
issue.4 It was not until one year after the NATO bombing campaign ended that any official 
Liberal government document used the term “war.”5  
In this thesis, I use the term ‘genocide’ as opposed to ‘ethnic cleansing’ when discussing 
the Kosovo War. The choice between using the term ‘genocide’ or the less severe term ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ was similarly contested by politicians at the time, and by historians who have since 
written about the Kosovo War. The importance of the terminology and how the words ‘genocide’ 
and ‘war’ are related is best illustrated in an exchange in the House of Commons on 12 April, 
1999, between Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and Progressive Conservative Member of 
Parliament André Bachand. While explaining the official Canadian position on the criminal 
prosecution of Slobodan Milošević, the President of Serbia and the President of the FRY, Prime 
Minister Chrétien referred to the events in Kosovo as “genocide.”6 Bachand saw this change in 
terminology as an opportunity to press the government on whether Canada was at war: “We 
often hear the Prime Minister talk about ethnic cleansing. It is now official, what is going on in 
 
4 Bob Bergen, Scattering Chaff: Canadian Air Power and Censorship during the Kosovo War (Calgary: University 
of Calgary Press, 2019), 8. 
5 Ibid.  




Kosovo is genocide. We should no longer call it ethnic cleansing, but genocide. Often, the 
solution to genocide is war. In the Prime Minister's opinion, in view of the genocide taking place 
in Kosovo—his very own words—is Canada at war?” Chrétien responded by withdrawing his 
use of the word genocide: “We are still talking about ethnic cleansing even though I used the 
other expression earlier. I should have said ethnic cleansing.” Chrétien was trying to avoid 
answering whether Canada was at war. Chrétien goes on to explain that “it is all a matter of 
terminology—and those responsible must face the consequences of their crimes against 
humanity.”7 
Sean Maloney, Canadian historian and author of Operation Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo, 
provides the rationale for the use of ‘genocide’ instead of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ In the late 1990s, 
out of a total of two million Kosovo Albanians, eight hundred fifty thousand of them were 
forcefully expelled from Kosovo into neighbouring countries, four hundred thousand of them 
were internally displaced, and ten thousand of them were murdered.8 Additionally, there was 
deliberate destruction of archives, libraries, land ownership documentation, personal 
documentation, and cultural artifacts. Maloney contends that, “...the combined effects of these 
events constituted genocide in its original 1948 definition…”9 I agree with Maloney's rationale 
for the use of the term genocide and have therefore chosen to use it. Discussion of terminology 
was integral to the decision-making during the Kosovo War and has been integral to the 
historiography written since, thereby making an acknowledgment of nomenclature integral to 
any writing on the topic. 
 
7 Ibid. 
8 Sean M. Maloney, Operation Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2018), xxii. 




 In 1999, British historian Noel Malcolm published the seminal work on the history of 
Kosovo. In his opening chapter, “A note on names and pronunciations,” he states that 
“[u]nfortunately it is not possible to devise any system that will not cause some offense to some 








CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION & HISTORIOGRAPHY 
The last fifteen years have seen the revitalisation of the field of Canadian international 
history. Whereas there was once a handful of scholars in the field focussing largely on the North 
Atlantic Triangle, it is now a growing field. Recent trends in scholarship in Canadian 
international history emphasize the role of race, culture, aid, and migration in Canadian foreign 
policy and politics.11 In addition, the expansion of the field is due to scholars diversifying the 
countries deemed worthy of inclusion in the study of Canada’s role in the world. An excellent 
example of this new direction in Canadian international history is Dominion of Race: Rethinking 
Canada’s International History. This edited collection was written with the intent to “explore 
Canada’s relations with places long regarded as marginal, including the Caribbean, China, 
Congo, France, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Japan, and Korea.”12 This thesis adds Kosovo, another 
place long regarded as marginal, to the study of Canadian international history. This is done by 
analyzing the influences on Canada’s decision-making process during the Kosovo War, focusing 
specifically on the domestic considerations – national unity and diaspora relations – which made 
Canada unique amongst the NATO countries.  
This research stems from the understanding that domestic considerations are integral to 
the creation of foreign policy. In his book, Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future, 
Lloyd Axworthy reflects on how he came to understand how closely related domestic and 
international issues were during his time as Minister of Employment and Immigration. This is 
 
11 See for example: Greg Donaghy and David Webster, A Samaritan State Revisited: Historical Perspectives on 
Canadian Foreign Aid (University of Calgary Press, 2019) or Karen Dubinsky, Sean Mills, and Scott 
Rutherford. Canada and the Third World : Overlapping Histories Toronto (Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 
2016).  
12 Laura Madokoro and Francine McKenzie, Dominion of Race: Rethinking Canada’s International History. 




clear when he states, “I was beginning to realize the global interconnectedness” in relation to 
Canada, domestic issues and the world.13 This realization led him to being “ready and willing” 
when asked to move to the foreign affairs portfolio.14  Similar reflections are found in the book, 
The Call of the World: A Political Memoir, written by Bill Graham, Liberal member of 
Parliament and Chair of the House of Commons’ Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
International Law (SCFAIT). In his chapter titled “All Geopolitics are Local,” he argues that 
domestic concerns and Canadian foreign policy are inextricably connected by stating: “I never 
failed to be struck by how directly connected the interests of my constituents were with my 
international work.”15 The close connection between foreign policy and domestic issues was not 
only obvious to politicians such as Axworthy and Graham; it was also obvious to policy experts 
and diplomats. In his book, Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Handbook for Canada, 
retired Canadian diplomat Paul Heinbecker includes two opening quotations. The first, by Lester 
B. Pearson reads, “Foreign policy is, after all, merely domestic policy with its hat on."16 The 
second, from a review of foreign policy done by Pierre Trudeau's government in 1970, reads, "In 
essence, foreign policy is the product of the government's progressive definition of and pursuit of 
national aims and interests in the international environment. It is the extension abroad of national 
policies."17 These quotations, and Heinbecker’s inclusion of them, illustrate that the 
interwovenness of domestic concerns and foreign policy has long been understood. A study of 
Canadian domestic issues and foreign policy during the Kosovo War demonstrates the extent to 
which this is true.  
 
13 Axworthy, 42. 
14 Ibid., 42. 
15 Bill Graham, The Call of the World: A Political Memoir (Vancouver: On Point Press/UBC Press, 2016), 193. 
16 Heinbecker, 192 





“I’m a Balkans expert but nobody ever calls anymore,” laments Dr. Robert C. Austin.18 
Austin, now a professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, was a leading expert on 
Albanian issues in the 1990s. He has advised the Canadian and American governments on issues 
pertaining to Kosovo and Albania. After the Kosovo War was over and the media attention had 
moved on, Dr. Austin dedicated an incredible amount of effort to bringing Canadian’s attention 
back to Kosovo by hosting speakers and politicians at the University of Toronto, including 
Kosovo’s President Ibrahim Rugova. He explains the larger purpose of these public lectures: 
“what we were doing was trying to introduce to Canada the notion that Kosovo needed to be 
talked about. So that was kind of an agenda.”19 Having become disillusioned with the lack of 
response from the government and scholars, Dr. Austin has largely given up on this agenda, but 
he continues to believe Kosovo is integral to Canada and is worth scholarly attention. He states, 
“the Balkans is like Hotel California, you can check out any time you like… but you can never 
leave! Kosovo is no exception.”20  
Similar frustration with the lack of attention Canada’s relationship with Kosovo has 
received is evident in other interviews conducted for this thesis. Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs during the Kosovo War, explained the reason he was keen to discuss Kosovo 
was because of the lack of attention it has received.21 Commenting on the paucity of scholarship 
Axworthy said, “it’s incredible, but I think it’s part of a larger problem with Canadian academics 
[…] generally they’re not very good at looking at Canadian ventures, which is why I was 
 
18 Author interview with Dr. Robert C. Austin, September 9, 2020. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid. 




interested in responding to you.”22 Austin and Axworthy are correct about both the limited 
attention that the relationship between Kosovo and Canada has received and the ongoing 
importance of Kosovo.  
The State of the Field  
The historical literature on Canada’s relationship with Kosovo has been extremely 
limited. It has focused on Canada’s role in the Kosovo War or on the years immediately prior to 
the war beginning in 1996, and following the war ending in 2001. The history is largely written 
from the subfields of either military history or diplomatic history. This lack of coverage can be 
attributed to four factors: the distraction caused by 9/11, emphasis on multilateral institutions, 
Kosovo being a part of Yugoslavia and limited sources.  
The first explanation for the limited amount of attention paid to Canada’s relationship 
with Kosovo, and to the Kosovo War more generally, is the distraction caused by the events of 
11 September, 2001. Both American and Canadian academics have specifically addressed how 
the events of 9/11 drew attention away from the history of the Kosovo War.  Immediately 
following the Kosovo War, a three-year rush of scholarship began. American books in this post-
Kosovo War rush include The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo written by Noam 
Chomsky,23 Kosovo Crossing: American Ideals Meet Reality on the Balkan Battlefields by David 
Fromkin,24 and War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age edited by Andrew J. 
 
22 Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020. 
23 Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 
1999). 





Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen.25 In Canada, historians, with exception of those within the military 
profession publishing in the Canadian Military Journal, were largely absent from that rush. Sean 
M. Maloney’s experience trying to publish his book, Operation Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo, 
speaks directly to the effect that 9/11 had on historians. He explains, “the events of 11 September 
2001 and the war that followed overshadowed my efforts and unfortunately ensured Operation 
Kinetic did not see the light of day at the time. The Balkans had seemingly become irrelevant, 
and publishers made that point clear.”26   
The second reason that Canada’s relationship with Kosovo has received such scant 
attention is that historians have written with a focus on the United Nations (UN) or NATO 
instead of focusing specifically on Canada or an individual country (with the exception of the 
United States). It is telling that even in the Canadian Forces’ military journal the focus is not on 
Canada. Since its creation in 1999, the Canadian Military Journal has included eleven articles 
about the Kosovo War, written by both academic historians and Canadian service members. Of 
these eleven articles, only three focus specifically on Canada’s contribution in the Kosovo War.27 
Of the other eight articles about the Kosovo War, four mention Canada’s role in passing, and 
four contain no reference to Canada whatsoever.28  
 
25 A.J. Bacevich and Andrew J. Cohen, War over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age (New York: 
Columbia University, 2001). 
26 Maloney, xvi. 
27 The articles on Canada’s contribution are:  Lt. Col. David L. Bashow et al., “Mission Ready: Canada’s Role in the 
Kosovo Air Campaign,” and Michael Ward et al., “Task Force Kosovo: Adapting Operations to a Changing Security 
Environment,” in Canadian Military Journal 1, no. 1 (2000); and Doug Delaney, “CIMIC Operations During 
Operations ‘KINETIC’,” Canadian Military Journal 1, no. 4 (2000). 
28 The articles that mention Canada are: The Lord Robertson, “NATO Operations in the Balkans,” J.R. Michel 
Maisonneuve, “The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission,” and Albert Legault, “NATO Intervention in Kosovo: The 
Legal Context,” in Canadian Military Journal 1, no. 1 (2000); and Alain Boyer, “Leadership and the Kosovo Air 
Campaign,” in Canadian Military Journal 3, no. 3 (2002). The articles that contain no mention are: Lenard J. 
Cohen, “Living an Illusion: Political Transition in Kosovo” Canadian Military Journal 1, no. 1 (2000); Klaus 
Naumann, “The Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Intervention and the Use of Military Force,” Canadian 




The third reason that Kosovo has received such scant attention is due to its history as a 
former province within Yugoslavia. The majority of scholarly publications that mention Kosovo 
analyze it as part of relations with Yugoslavia. Kosovo was a part of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia until the Kosovo War in 1999 and did not gain independence until 2008. Therefore, 
Canada did not have formal diplomatic relations with Kosovo until recently. This thesis will 
argue that despite this, Canada’s relationship and actions toward Kosovo are worthy of singular 
attention.  
Finally, Canada’s relationship with Kosovo has received such scant attention due to the 
recentness of the event. It has only been twenty years since Canada participated in the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo. This means that many of the relevant documents are still restricted by 
the government and can only be obtained through Access to Information Act requests. Memoirs 
of those Canadians who played important roles in the handling of the Kosovo issue are either 
written recently or remain unwritten. Thus, the types of sources that serve as the bread and butter 
of the history profession are still limited. Due to these limitations, historians who have chosen to 
write on the topic rely heavily on interviews, media, and Access to Information requests. These 
reasons explain the limited amount of historical scholarship on Canada’s relationship with 
Kosovo and Canada’s foreign policy toward Kosovo. Nonetheless, singular attention to Canada’s 
relationship with Kosovo is worthwhile because it illuminates the unique considerations Canada 
had when determining its foreign policy.  
Therefore, the state of the literature on Canada’s relationship with Kosovo can be 
attributed to distraction caused by 9/11, emphasis on multilateral institutions, Kosovo’s role 
 
Military Journal, 5, no. 4 (2005); and Louis Henault, “The Kosovo Crisis: Toward a New Conception of Aerial War 




within Yugoslavia and limited availability of sources. Yet, as emphasized by Axworthy and 
Austin, understanding Canada’s actions towards Kosovo is a worthwhile pursuit. Canada’s 
relationship with Kosovo may be short, as far as relations between countries go, but it has been 
eventful. The Canadian side of the relationship has included diplomacy, participation in the 
Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), participation in a seventy-eight day NATO led bombing of 
Serbia, participation in Kosovo Force (KFOR) after the bombing ended, participation in the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), sending Canadian police 
officers, investigators, and corrections officers to aid in the stabilization of Kosovo, financial aid, 
settling refugees, and eventually recognizing Kosovo’s independence.  
Literature Review: Within History  
The first contributions to the historiography of Canada’s involvement with Kosovo from 
within the discipline of history are found in the Canadian Military Journal. The majority of the 
first volume is dedicated to the Kosovo War and its aftermath. Of the six articles, only one 
contains no mention of Canada’s role. Three of the articles are not written about Canada 
specifically, but include brief mentions. In “NATO Operations in the Balkans,” the Right 
Honourable, Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, focuses on other countries, and 
NATO in general, pausing occasionally to comment, “Canada should be very proud of its role” 
and to commend Canada for “punching well above its weight.”29 The article, “The OSCE 
Kosovo Verification Mission,” by Brigadier-General J.R. Michel Maisonneuve, is not about 
Canada, but includes a short one paragraph section titled “The Canadian Contribution,” in which 
he commends that the Canadians’ contribution “was, as has come to be expected, greater than 
 




their size.”30 In “NATO Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Context,” Professor Albert Legault 
does not mention Canada until the last two sentences of the article when he explores the 
implications for Canada.31 Hence, of the six articles in the Canadian Military Journal, one does 
not mention Canada at all, and three vaguely commend Canada for “punching above its weight” 
but do not specifically examine Canada’s role. 
It is in this context that the remaining two articles, specifically written on Canada’s 
contribution, are found. The first, “Mission Ready: Canada’s Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign,” 
was co-authored by eight men, three of whom had a background in history, including Captain 
James Pickett who was Chief Air Force Historian at the time.32 “Mission Ready” assesses the 
Canadian air operations over Kosovo in 1999, as well as the lessons learned for future 
operations. The authors specifically discuss the challenges Canadians faced in Kosovo, and how 
aptly they overcame them. The thesis is that Canada’s performance was commendable, and at 
times “super human.”33 The article goes to great lengths to distinguish Canada’s contribution 
from that of other countries. For example, when discussing participation in high-risk missions 
the authors are careful to point out that Canada had “a higher percentage of these perilous 
missions that any of the other NATO nations.”34 Extra attention is paid distinguishing Canada 
from the Americans. For example, the article gives the example of Canadian Sergeant Neal who 
realized Americans were incorrectly burning laser codes, rendering bombs unusable and then 
taught the United States Air Force armament technicians the proper way. According to the 
 
30 J.R. Michel Maisonneuve, “The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission,” Canadian Military Journal 1, no. 1 (2000): 
50. 
31 Albert Legault, “NATO Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Context,” Canadian Military Journal 1, no. 1 (2000): 
66. 
32 Lt. Col. David L. Bashow et al., “Mission Ready: Canada’s Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign,” Canadian 
Military Journal 1, no. 1 (2001). 
33 Lt. Col. David L. Bashow et al., 60.  




article, this enabled Americans to use over 90 percent of the bombs previously considered 
unserviceable, saving tens of millions of dollars.35 The article goes on to state, “[o]f greater 
important, Sergeant Neal’s initiative and ingenuity saved the bombing campaign from suffering 
critical shortages.”36 Emphasis on Canadian performance, especially in comparison to that of 
Americans, is an ongoing theme. For example, when Canada’s success rate of 70 percent is 
described as “close to that of Canada’s most proficient allies,” and the fact Canada led over half 
of the strike packages they participated in, is proof of Canadian professionalism and expertise “in 
this massively American-dominated air campaign.”37 The crux of this article is that the Canadian 
contribution was commendable, and the fact that Kosovo will be one of the most instructive wars 
in the future, more instructive even than the Gulf War.38  
The second article, “Task Force Kosovo: Adapting Operations to a Changing Security 
Environment,” was written by four authors including historian Major Doug Delaney, two of 
which held BA’s in history from the Royal Military College of Canada. This article explores 
important impressions and lessons learned from KFOR, the NATO operation in Kosovo when 
the bombing was finished. It explores the challenges that the Canadian military faced, and how 
they overcame those challenges. It especially criticizes the lack of Canadian intra-agency 
cooperation and blames the lack of cooperation for Canada’s lack of profile saying, “Canada 
receives no collective credit for their achievements. As far as boosting Canada's profile within 
the KFOR coalition, UNMIK or even the North Atlantic Council is concerned, they are barely 
visible.”39 The article argues that Kosovo proves that Canada had the qualifications necessary to 
 
35 Ibid., 58. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 61.  
39 Michael Ward et al., “Task Force Kosovo: Adapting Operations to a Changing Security Environment,” Canadian 




lead coalition operations and should have done so. The authors stress that intra-agency 
cooperation should become a priority in order to “boost our national profile, proving that we can 
be front runners in the planning and conduct of peace support operations. Then, perhaps, 
Canadians would receive the sort of credit and policy influence we justly deserve.”40 As 
illustrated above, the Canadian Military Journal articles that mention Canada have a few threads 
in common. First, they are written by authors who have first-hand experience in either the 
Kosovo War or in the subsequent KFOR stabilization efforts. Most importantly, the publications 
are tied together by the need to illuminate Canada’s role in the Kosovo War. Particularly through 
emphasizing the difference and importance of Canada’s contributions compared to other NATO 
countries, especially the United States.  
There are two books, also written by military historians, that specifically focus on Canada 
and Kosovo. Bob Bergen, who completed his PhD in History after retiring from a twenty-five-
year career in journalism, wrote one of these books called Scattering Chaff: Canadian Air Power 
and Censorship During the Kosovo War. Scattering Chaff illustrates how the Canadian Forces 
severely restricted, if not fully censored, the Canadian news media by invoking operational 
security concerns during the Kosovo War in 1999. Bergen is highly critical of Prime Minister 
Chrétien’s government’s media policy and lack of military spending, though he does not criticize 
its foreign policy. Bergen explains that Canada was involved in the Kosovo War in order to “halt 
the violence and avert an even bigger humanitarian disaster.”41 Like the other authors, Bergen 
writes with the goal of bringing attention to the Kosovo War. It is his position that as a result of 
the Canadian Forces’ media policy, the service men and women were denied the recognition they 
 
40 Ibid. 




deserved. Despite being critical of how Chrétien’s government’s handled domestic media policy, 
Bergen praises Canada’s role in the Kosovo War itself. According to Bergen, the restrictive 
media policy has kept Canadians from knowing “the incredible success stories; and the absolute 
skill, dedication, and bravery of the aircrews.”42 This lack of public knowledge motivated Bergen 
to write the book. Like authors in the Canadian Military Journal, Bergen highlights Canada’s 
ability to “punch above its weight,”, especially compared to the United States.  
The other book that focuses on Canada and Kosovo is written by Canadian historian Sean 
Maloney and is called Operation Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo. Maloney aims to tell the story of 
Canada’s contribution to the NATO led KFOR and the overall stabilization of the country 
following the Kosovo War and NATO led bombing campaign. Like Austin, Axworthy, and the 
authors mentioned thus far, Maloney is motivated to tell the story of Kosovo because he believes 
it has wrongly been ignored saying, “[t]he intervention was the first time in the 1990s that ethnic 
cleansing was arrested while it was in progress and the effects reversed. That alone should merit 
historical recognition if not praise for those who conceived and carried out those operations.”43 
Maloney is highly critical of diplomats, bureaucrats, politicians, and the media and argues that 
those involved in the military and humanitarian achievement in Kosovo “should no longer be 
subjected to one-sided excoriation by those critics in the comfortable and safe surroundings of 
the human rights industry, academia, the legal profession, the internet, and the diplomatic 
cocktail party.”44 Like the other authors, Maloney emphasizes the size and quality of Canada’s 
contribution to maintaining peace in Kosovo: providing Michel Maisonneuve as one of five 
regional commanders in 1998, leading over half of the air combat missions assigned to them, and 
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performing extraordinarily within KFOR. Like the other authors, Maloney likewise asserts 
Canadian exceptionality in Kosovo. He argues that the civilians especially loved the Canadians, 
with Albanians known to cry out: “thank God for Canadians!”45 Maloney stresses Canadian 
performance in comparison to that of the United States. Maloney credits Canada, namely Chief 
of Defence Art Eggleton, for convincing a wavering Clinton administration to commit to using 
ground forces to stabilize Kosovo, essentially crediting Canada for the creation of KFOR. In the 
words of Maloney, pressure from Canadians was “a significant factor in the American decision-
making process.”46 Maloney’s book is concerned with the credit Canada receives on the 
international stage. He argues that Canada needs to deploy forces that are large and useful 
enough that they are not merely symbolism because as he explains, “symbolism does not permit 
Canada to wield political influence in NATO circles.”47 Thus, Maloney engages in the same 
quest to boost Canada’s national profile as other authors such as Delaney et al. do.  
The only two academic publications written on Canada’s diplomatic history with Kosovo 
are by Michael Manulak. Although Manulak is a political scientist, he includes notes of thanks to 
his Masters supervisor Norman Hillmer in all of his works. This illustrates the prominent 
Canadian foreign relations historian, Norman Hillmer’s continued influence on Manulak’s work. 
In a comment on the field of Canadian international history prominent Canadian historian John 
English explained “[h]istory departments […] paid a large price when students who wanted to 
study international affairs turned to other disciplines.”48  Although Manulak is not technically a 
historian, his work is the only diplomatic history of Canada and Kosovo written thus far. In the 
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article, “Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: A ‘Golden Moment’ in Canadian Foreign Policy?”, 
Manulak argues that Canada “did not simply offer troops in a fainthearted or half-hearted gesture 
to NATO, but effectively employed its resources to play an important part in the diplomacy that 
led to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, in the maintenance of allied unity, 
and in Operation Allied Force.”49 He concentrates on the intensification of diplomatic attention 
to the Kosovo issue, the decision to intervene, the conduct of the campaign, the consideration of 
ground options, and the diplomatic process that brought resolution. Like the authors published in 
the Canadian Military Journal, Manulak was motivated by a desire to prove the value and scope 
of Canada’s contribution, but with a focus on diplomacy not the military. According to Manulak, 
who relies on public source documents and extensive interviews, the Kosovo issue was 
characterized by a high degree of domestic consensus, an effective communications strategy, and 
an effective and depoliticised decision making process.50 It is worth noting that on the topic of 
Canada’s role in military planning and conduct during the air operations, Manulak asserts 
Canada “had a limited role.”51 Just as the diplomats’ role is either absent or underemphasized in 
the military histories, the military’s role is underemphasized in the diplomatic history. Manulak 
concludes the article by stating, “[c]ontrary to the period's popular discourse, during the Kosovo 
crisis, Canadian foreign policy leaders advanced Canada's interests [...]”52 This sentence 
contrasts the military historians who lament that the Kosovo War and the crisis surrounding it 
represent a missed opportunity to raise Canada’s profile in the world. What this article has in 
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common with the military historians’ articles is the motivation to distinguish Canada’s 
contributions on the world stage.  
In 2011, Manulak published Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: An Agenda for Intervention 
as a part of Queen’s University’s Centre for International Relations Martello Papers. This 
monograph is very similar to Manulak’s 2009 article which argues that Canada had an important 
and underappreciated diplomatic role in the Kosovo War. The major difference is the format. 
Instead of simply presenting the history of Canada’s contribution in the Kosovo War, Manulak 
applies John W. Kingdon's multiple-streams model, outlined in the book Agendas, Alternatives, 
and Public Policies.53 Manulak’s most recent publication on the topic of Kosovo and Canada is 
an article titled, “Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: Looking back, 20 years on.” This opinion piece 
is from the website OpenCanada by the Centre for International Governance Innovation, which 
aims to create content to explain and unite the fields of public policy, academic scholarship, and 
journalism.54 This opinion piece aims to briefly tell the history of Canada’s involvement in 
Kosovo and to revisit where the relations are twenty years later. Like his first two publications, 
Manulak reasserts that “Canada played a central role in the end of the 1999 Kosovo conflict” to 
illustrate the power of diplomacy backed by military power.55 Though opinion piece includes a 
photo of former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy at the opening of the Canadian office in 
Kosovo’s capital in 2009, a year after Kosovo declared independence, web source does not 
mention Canada / Kosovo relations following the 1999 military conflict. It also does not mention 
that the Canadian office in Prishtina/Priština closed before 2019. This opinion piece illustrates 
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that although historians are publishing on the topic, their analysis of Canada’s involvement in the 
1999 Kosovo War does not extend beyond the military conflict and the immediate aftermath. 
Although Manulak has a continued interest in international organizations, multilateral 
diplomacy, Canadian foreign policy, and non-proliferation, he no longer actively researches or 
publishes on the Kosovo War, except for the referenced web source.  
Literature Review: Outside of History   
The following are brief descriptions of literature that has been written on Canada’s 
relationship with Kosovo outside of the discipline of history.  
Much of the writings on Canada and Kosovo’s diplomatic history are found in the 
memoirs of retired diplomats and politicians. Examples of retired diplomats and politicians and 
diplomats who have written about Kosovo are Lloyd Axworthy in his memoir Navigating a New 
World: Canada's Global Future, Bill Graham in his memoir The Call of the World: A Political 
Memoir, and Paul Heinbecker in his book Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Playbook 
for Canada. This fits English’s assessment that Canadian international history is being written by 
former diplomats and politicians.56 However, It is important to acknowledge the limitation of 
history written by diplomats and politicians. When discussing writing a memoir, Bill Graham 
regretted that a lengthy career and page limitations meant he could not dedicate as much space in 
his book to topics like Kosovo as he would have liked.57 Axworthy expressed frustration at 
academia’s lack of attention to Kosovo and to Canadian international history.58 These 
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frustrations expressed by Axworthy and Graham advocate for the important role Canadian 
historians have in writing international history.  
The next relevant publication is “Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower” in 
the edited volume Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO’s War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?.59 
This chapter is authored by political scientists Kim Richard Nossal and Stéphane Roussel. Unlike 
Manulak, whose education merged the disciplines of history, political science, and international 
relations, Nossal and Roussel are situated firmly in the discipline of political science. In this 
chapter, Nossal and Roussel argue that Canada contributed only minimally to the Kosovo War 
both militarily and diplomatically. They assert that the negotiations and the NATO bombing 
were a “hegemonic operation cloaked in multilateralism” and that all important and trivial 
decisions were made in Washington.60 They assert that this does not mean Canada was forced 
into the war, in fact, quite the opposite. According to Nossal and Roussel, Canada was a “happy 
follower.”61 It is important to include the perspective of political scientists on the subject because 
those who lament the decline in Canada’s international history are most worried about the field 
being taken over by scholars of political science and international relations. In his article “The 
Tragedies of Canadian International History,” Canadian international historian David Meren 
asserts that “political scientists and former diplomats were responsible for an increasingly large 
share of the literature on Canada's diplomatic history.” Despite being wary of history being 
written by scholars in other disciplines Meren concedes that political scientists offer invaluable 
insight into Canadian diplomatic history; however, he believes that their applicability to the 
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historic profession is limited by their use of “different epistemologies and methodologies.”62 In 
the case of “Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower,” Meren is right. As previously 
mentioned Manulak, is a political scientist who trained under and was deeply influenced by 
esteemed Canadian international historian Norman Hillmer. His research led him to a drastically 
different conclusion than that of Nossal and Roussel. Manulak argues Canada was a diplomatic 
leader during the Kosovo War, yet Nossal and Roussel argue Canada was merely a “happy 
follower.” Manulak directly addresses his disagreement with Nossal and Roussel’s assessment in 
his work.63 This is just one example that illustrates how political scientists assessing Canada’s 
role in Kosovo and its relationship with the United States can differ drastically in their 
conclusions compared to those made by historians.  
Similarities within the Literature 
An analysis of the historical writings on Kosovo and Canada reveals that the assessment 
of the field made by Meren and English is correct. First, all the authors except for Manulak are or 
were directly involved to some capacity in the Kosovo War. Unsurprisingly, the authors in the 
Canadian Military Journal were personally involved in the Kosovo War. The Canadian Military 
Journal is the professional journal of the Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence, 
meant to serve as a forum for members of the academic community with a special interest in 
security and defence matters, and to inform Canadians in general about Canada’s military.  
Bergen is a former journalist who specialized in reporting on the Canadian Forces for twenty-
five years before finishing his doctorate in military history. He covered Canada’s role in the 
Kosovo War. Maloney, now a professor of History at the Royal Military College of Canada, was 
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the historian in the Balkans for the 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade. Thus, although not solely 
done by retired politicians or diplomats, the fact that the majority of the writing on Canada and 
Kosovo is by authors who were personally involved fits English’s description of the field of 
Canadian international history. One could argue that this thesis being written by a former refugee 
of the Kosovo War falls into this trend.  
In addition, an analysis of the historiography illustrates that because of the recent nature 
of the events, the authors writing on Kosovo rely heavily on interviews or information accessed 
through Access to Information Act requests. For Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: An Agenda for 
Intervention, Manulak relied on Access to Information Act requests and conducted twenty-four 
interviews. Nine of the interviews were with Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade (DFAIT) officials, three with Department of National Defence officials, two with 
Members of Cabinet, five with members of the Canadian Forces, one with the Privy Council 
Office, one with a Prime Minister's Office official, one with an International Fora Official, and 
two within Civil Society. Manulak specifies that the interviews were held confidentially in order 
to enable more candid conversations and as a result are not cited in the paper. He notes that “on 
the whole, the interviewees were extremely accommodating and forth-coming” and that “the 
timing of the interviews, approximately ten years after the 1998-1999 crisis in Kosovo, was 
fortuitous because the interview subjects were able to recall their activities in detail, while 
feeling sufficiently free to speak in a frank matter.”64  
Similarly, the strength of Scattering Chaff is the quality and quantity of primary research 
that Bergen undertook. The Chrétien Government, Department of National Defence, and 
 




Canadian Forces’ documents obtained through the federal Access to Information Act provide 
unique insight into the policies and disinformation that surrounded the Kosovo War. In cases 
where Bergen was denied access to requested documents, he is careful to explain why based on 
the Access to Information Act.65 As the old adage goes, sometimes you can learn more from what 
is left unsaid than what is said. In Scattering Chaff, Bergen makes sure the reader learns from 
what is left unreleased, as well as what has been released. Bergen also performs in-depth analysis 
of multiple Canadian and American newspapers to illustrate the type of coverage, and lack of 
coverage received by Canadians in the Kosovo War. Scattering Chaff includes oral testimony 
from interviews with some of Canada's most prominent journalists including Paul Workman, 
Neil Macdonald, Geoffrey York, and Joy Malbon. In addition, for the writing of Scattering 
Chaff, Bergen was given unprecedented permission to interview military service men and 
women. He conducted numerous interviews of service members of all ranks including, to his 
surprise, Chief of Defence Staff General Ray Henault, the highest-ranking officer in the 
Canadian Forces.  
Like Manulak and Bergen, Maloney relies heavily on documents obtained through the 
Access to Information Act and interviews with service members. Of course, each of the works 
have their limitations. For example, the authors limited their sources to primary sources and to 
interviews from within their own professions. Military historians largely ignored the role of 
diplomacy, and diplomatic historians largely ignored the role of the military. Neither the military 
nor the diplomatic historians included any facets of social or cultural history in their analysis. 
Regardless of these limitations, the ability of these historians to write on Kosovo and Canada 
indicates that the hindrance caused by the recent nature of the events can be successfully 
 




overcome. Much like in these publications, this thesis overcomes this hindrance through 
analyzing primary sources such as media, Hansards, and interviews. 
Each of the authors who have written on Kosovo focus on narrow topics. Manulak 
focuses on the diplomacy, Maloney focuses on KFOR’s ground operations, and Bergen focuses 
on the air campaign. Therefore, there is substantial disagreement between the authors on aspects 
of Canada’s involvement in Kosovo. For example, in Operation Kinetic Maloney comes down 
hard on a variety of groups including diplomats and the media. If Maloney had taken into 
consideration the writings of other historians, such as Manulak, his assessment of diplomats may 
have been more balanced. Maloney and Bergen agree that the quality and quantity of media 
coverage of Canada’s contributions in the Kosovo War was insufficient. However, they disagree 
on the cause. Maloney squarely blames the media, where the entire crux of Bergen’s Scattering 
Chaff is an explanation of how the government’s lack of transparency is to blame. In sharp 
contrast to both Bergen and Maloney, Manulak praises both the media’s attentiveness and the 
government’s transparency when he states, “the media received high-level commentary and 
maintained an interest in the briefings throughout the campaign […] The communications 
strategy remains unique among Canadian deployments and was a vital means of informing 
public interest in the mission.”66 The central argument of Scattering Chaff is that the 
communications strategy, which Manulak praises, declined in relevance and in transparency 
throughout the campaign and was directly against the public interest. Political scientists Nossal 
and Roussel disagree with all the authors and argue that Canada only minimally contributed to 
the Kosovo War both militarily and diplomatically.   
 




It is therefore all the more telling when each of the authors agree on a crucial point: what 
motivated Canada’s involvement in Kosovo. All authors agree that Canada’s involvement was 
motivated by a mix of humanitarian concerns, concerns over regional stability in the Balkans, 
and alliance obligation in NATO. It is also telling that even Nossal and Roussel agree on this 
point. Although they argue Canada followed what the United States decided, they argue they did 
so happily because they were motivated by humanitarian concerns and alliance obligations. This 
agreement is all the more significant in light of the fact that what amounts to a non-existent 
debate among the historiography of Canada and the Kosovo War is the most heated debate in the 
broader historiography of NATO and the Kosovo War. For example, in the broader 
historiography of the Kosovo War when reviewing the diplomatic record, American historian 
and philosopher Noam Chomsky dismisses the American efforts to get Yugoslavia to accept the 
Rambouillet Agreement and calls it the “take-it-or-get-bombed approach.”67 He speculates that 
the wording of the agreement was purposely designed to fail and says that perhaps someday the 
truth will come out and it may be asked whether the “diplomatic failure” was the “rationally 
chosen course that led to a predictable victory [military] for the values that mattered.”68 It should 
be noted that when Chomsky refers to the “values that mattered” he does so in a pejorative sense, 
mocking the morality of the United States. Chomsky is not the only author who makes this 
argument based on the diplomatic record at Rambouillet. American political scientist James 
Kurth, in his chapter “First War of A Global Era” in War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in 
a Global Age, analyzes the Rambouillet Agreement and argues that although there was nothing 
diplomatically unusual in the text of the agreement itself, the inclusion of Appendix B was 
outside standard diplomatic negotiating practice. Appendix B would have given NATO forces 
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the right to conduct military operation anywhere within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Kurth states simply, “the actions of the U.S. diplomats in the Rambouillet negotiations in 
February and March 1999 strongly indicate that the United States wanted Serbia to reject a 
political solution to the problem posed by Kosovo. This rejection would then be used to justify a 
NATO war against Serbia.”69 Chomsky and Kurth illustrate the opinions of a contingent of 
authors within the historiography of the Kosovo War that believe the U.S. did not negotiate in 
good faith. Other American authors such as retired diplomat David L. Phillips strongly reject this 
notion and argue that negotiations were conducted earnestly to try and prevent a humanitarian 
tragedy comparable to Rwanda. In the words of Phillips, “[t]hough war always represents the 
failure of diplomacy, the Clinton administration had done everything possible to negotiate a 
peaceful outcome.”70 Thus, a brief comparison between American and Canadian historiography 
of the event shows that what Canadian historians take as a given, American scholars think of as 
anything but.  
As analyzed above, all the Canadian historians were motivated by the need to distinguish 
Canada’s contribution in Kosovo. This could be considered an example of what Meren criticizes 
as “romanticized notions of Canada's international action.”71 A particular emphasis is placed on 
highlighting Canada’s successes and contributions in comparison to that of other NATO 
countries, especially to that of the United States. This could be considered an example of 
Canada’s kid-sibling complex and need to prove itself on the world stage. This kid-sibling 
complex was solidified by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau at a state dinner with U.S. President 
Barack Obama when Trudeau said, “We’re actually closer than friends. We’re more like siblings, 
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really. We have shared parentage, though we took different paths in our later years. We became 
the stay-at-home type. You grew to be a little more rebellious.”72 The emphasis on Canada’s 
contribution in comparison to that of the United States could be proof of a kid-sibling complex 
amongst historians. However, more likely this emphasis is a perfectly legitimate response. In this 
case, the elder Trudeau’s appraisal of the relationship is more accurate. Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau’s description of Canada / U.S. relations when meeting U.S. President Richard Nixon 
exemplifies the reasonableness of this response. Pierre Elliot Trudeau exclaimed, “Living next to 
you is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly and even-tempered 
is the beast, if I can call it that, one is affected by every twitch and grunt.”73 Historians must 
honestly balance acknowledging the effect the elephant has on Canada, and the ways Canada 
remains unmoved by the beast. Highlighting Canada’s contribution is especially important in 
light of the ignorance of American scholars towards Canada’s contributions. An example can be 
found in David L. Phillips book Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention. 
David L. Phillips worked as a diplomat on the Kosovo file for over twenty years, and was close 
friends with important Balkan diplomats, such as Richard Holbrooke, who the book is dedicated 
to. In Liberating Kosovo, Phillips references the contributions of many of the NATO allied 
countries and makes not a single reference to Canada. 
Conclusion & Contribution 
 “Canada deserves answers.” These three words were emphasized by Progressive 
Conservative member of Parliament Peter MacKay in a heated House of Commons discussion 
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about Kosovo on 12 April, 1999. MacKay, like other parliamentarians at the time, wanted Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien and the Liberal government in power to clarify what the Canadian 
position on the Kosovo issue was. “This is the American view. What is the Canadian 
government’s view?”, MacKay asked.74 Despite confrontations, such as this one, all the parties 
in the House of Commons supported Canada’s involvement in Kosovo and believed the 
involvement was necessary because of Canada’s humanitarian and regional stability interests. 
From the first time Kosovo was mentioned in Parliament on 18 November, 1991, to this heated 
exchange in 1999, Canadian parliamentarians attempted to distinguish what Canada’s views on 
Kosovo were. As evidenced above, historians who have written about Canada and Kosovo have 
likewise been occupied with the same task. Historians since and politicians at the time have tried 
to distinguish the Canadian contribution and position in comparison to the United States. 
Another similarity is like the historians, none of the parliamentarians at the time questioned what 
motivated Canada’s policy in Kosovo. Therefore, there was consensus at the time, and has been 
consensus since, about what motivated Canada’s policy towards Kosovo: humanitarian concerns, 
regional stability concerns, and obligation to the NATO alliance.  
The historiography on Canada’s role in Kosovo is pre-occupied with distinguishing 
Canada’s contributions in comparison to those of the United States while simultaneously not 
engaging in the debate integral to the American historiography about what motivated NATO’s 
involvement in Kosovo. However, an analysis of the primary sources reveals that Canada had 
additional and unique considerations during the Kosovo crisis, those being national unity and 
cultural communities. Yes, Canada was motivated by concerns regarding humanitarian need, 
regional stability, and alliance obligation. However, Canada also had a unique set of domestic 
 




considerations when deciding how to react to issues in Kosovo. Therefore, by studying the 
domestic factors Canada dealt with during the Kosovo War, it is possible to both distinguish 
Canada’s contribution, and to participate in the debate Canadian historians have not been present 
in. Many of the sources written on Canada and Kosovo jump straight into an analysis of the 
Kosovo War, giving little to no historical context. The ones that do provide historical context fall 
into the trap of vilifying or mythologizing the Balkans. As such, before providing an analysis of 
domestic considerations Canada had during the Kosovo War, it is important to answer the 




















CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
“The little shop of horrors called the Balkans.” – Sean Maloney, Operation Kinetic: Stabilizing 
Kosovo   
“There are no easy or straightforward explanations to anything that happens in the Balkans.”      
– Sean Maloney, Operation Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo 
“To the outside world, the Balkan peninsula often has been pictured as a land that time forgot: of 
peasant villages from the Middle Ages; of feuds and clans, of conspiracies and assassinations. 
And Europe, in particular, remembers it – with reason – as a political labyrinth in which great 
powers, if imprudent enough to enter it, can end up losing their way, or their lives.” – David 
Fromkin, Kosovo Crossing: The Reality of American Intervention in the Balkans  
“According to the cliché, in the Balkans there is too much history in too small a space.” – Robert 
Austin, Making and Remaking the Balkans: Nations and States since 1878 
“The Balkans produce more history than they can consume.” – Winston Churchill, in David L. 
Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention  
 
 The type of mythologizing illustrated in these quotations is commonplace in the 
historiography of the Balkans. Despite its prevalence, this type of description is neither useful 
nor accurate. If anything, it is counterproductive to the academic pursuit. This type of rhetoric 
suggests a false equivalency between Balkan conflicts, ignoring the individual factors which 
make each unique. Such mythologizing of the Balkans was also prevalent among politicians. 
When discussing Kosovo, Prime Minister Chrétien referred to “ancient hates and grievances,”75 
New Democratic Party Member of Parliament Peter Mancini referred to “ancient grudges and 
ancient hatreds,”76 and Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament Charlie Power 
commented, “the history of the whole Balkan area and the nature of the many hundreds of years 
of conflict and hatred which have existed in that area and have flourished for some strange 
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reason.”77 References to “ancient hatreds” that have prevailed for “some strange reason” 
obfuscate the responsibility of politicians and policies in creating conflict. Scholars such as 
journalist Tim Judah, the author of Kosovo: War and Revenge and Kosovo: What Everyone 
Needs to Know and historian Noel Malcolm, the author of Kosovo: A Short History, have taken 
on the task of explaining the Balkans and Kosovo without the mythologizing or vilifying that is 
so prevalent. Malcolm explains that the prevailing western view of Balkan conflicts “was always 
that these were ‘ethnic conflicts’ created by the bubbling up of obscure but virulent ethnic 
hatreds among the local populations. This whole approach to the subject was essentially false: it 
ignored the primary role of politicians […] in creating conflict at the political level.”78  
This thesis is neither a history of Kosovo nor a history of the Balkans. It is a study of 
what domestic factors were unique to Canada during the decision making surrounding the 
Kosovo War. However, one cannot understand Canada’s involvement in Kosovo without some 
understanding of why Canada was involved in the first place. This preface aims to provide a 
short overview of the history of Kosovo and of Canada’s involvement with the Balkans.79  
Part 1: The History of Kosovo  
The Battle of Kosovo  
 In his book Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know, Tim Judah states that “Serbs have 
argued that Kosovo is the heart of Serbia. If that is the case, retort Albanians, then the Serbian 
heart beats in a foreign body.”80 At the heart of this statement is the uncomfortable truth that both 
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Albanians and Serbians believe that Kosovo rightfully belongs to them. When politicians refer to 
“ancient ethnic hatreds” they are most likely referring to The Battle of Kosovo, whether they 
know so or not is a different question. The Battle of Kosovo took place on 28 June, 1389. In this 
battle, Serbian Prince Lazar and his forces were defeated by the Ottoman army at Fushë Kosovë / 
Kosovo Polje, on the outskirts of Prishtina / Priština. This defeat initiated five hundred years of 
Ottoman rule. Tim Judah comments that “[s]urprisingly little is known about this famous 
battle.”81 The reason for this is because The Battle of Kosovo not only initiated five hundred 
years of Ottoman rule, it also initiated six hundred years of nationalist myth-making by both 
Albanians and Serbians. In the Canadian House of Commons in 1988, Progressive Conservative 
Member of Parliament Andrew Witer invited all Canadians to join in celebrating Serbian Day 
and to “commemorate an important event in Serbian history, the Battle of Kosovo.”82 What is 
important to understand for the purpose of this thesis is that Kosovo has been a contested 
territory for hundreds of years, and the relevant “ancient” events are obscured by national myths 
on both sides.  
Congress of Berlin to the Paris Peace Conference 
 By the second half of 19th century, the Ottoman Empire had weakened and started to lose 
control of their territories. After Russia’s proposal for re-drawing the Balkans – following their 
victory in the Russian-Ottoman War in 1877 – was rejected, German chancellor Otto Von 
Bismarck organized the Congress of Berlin. At the Congress of Berlin, Albanians asked for 
autonomy, not independence, but were denied. After the Congress of Berlin, Albanian lands 
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were given to Serbia and Montenegro. In response, the Albanians created the League for the 
Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nation. 
The next twenty-five years would be marked by unrest in the Balkans and the 
nationalizing of Albanians. By August 1912, the nationalizing campaigns and constant revolts of 
Albanians led the Ottoman Empire to agree to a unified Albanian state. However, by October 
1912, the First Balkan War started when Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece declared war 
on the Ottomans. During all of this, on 28 November 1912, Albania declared independence with 
the support of Austria-Hungary. In the following year, the Great Powers, accepted Albania's 
independence with Russia’s agreement. Importantly, at this same meeting Serbia was given 
Kosovo, whose land it had taken over during the fighting in previous years. Albanians were then 
split between two countries: Albania and Kosovo, which was now part of Serbia. In the words of 
Balkan specialist Robert C. Austin: “Making Kosovo Serbian launched decades of Belgrade-
imposed misery.”83  
During the next four years, the world, including the Balkans, was distracted by the First 
World War. In 1915, Serbia was forced to retreat, and Austria-Hungary gained control of 
Kosovo. This was short-lived. In October 1918, Serbia regained control of Kosovo and in the 
words of Judah: “[t]he reconquest was brutal.”84 Two months later, on 1 December, 1918, the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was declared, and was informally called Yugoslavia. 
The Kingdom included Croatia, Dalmatia, Vojvodina, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, but was dominated by Serbia. In the years following, 
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there was armed resistance by Albanians, as well as a continued effort by Albanians to retain 
their national identity and culture.  
The Second World War  
 During the Second World War in 1939, Albania was invaded by Italy. In 1941, Serbia 
was invaded by Nazi Germany. During this time Kosovo was divided between Bulgaria, 
Germany, and Albania (under the control of Italy). Under the occupation of Nazi Germany, 
Albanians were allowed to have an autonomous regime, set up Albanian schools, and to carry on 
other nationalist activities. During this time, Serbians were the victim of attacks by Albanians 
and were used as labour by Italy and Nazi Germany. Albanians in Albania and Albanians in 
Kosovo reacted differently to their occupiers. Albanians in Albania resisted the Italians; 
however, Albanians in Kosovo, for the most part, did not resist the Nazis. As Judah explains, 
“[t]he real enemy, as far as Albanians were concerned, were the Serbs, and the Allies were 
making no promises about not returning Kosovo to Yugoslav control after the war.”85 The 
Albanians of Kosovo were correct, after the Allied victory in 1945, Kosovo and its inhabitants 
were returned to the control of the newly created Socialist Yugoslavia.  
Socialist Yugoslavia  
Socialist Yugoslavia was formed in 1946 by Josip Broz Tito, who along with his 
communist-led Partisans, ousted the Nazis in 1944 to 1945. In 1948, after a power struggle 
between Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, Yugoslavia was 
kicked out of the Soviet Bloc and took Kosovo with them. The communist leader of Albania, 
Enver Hoxha, sided with Stalin. What is significant to understand is that Albanians in Albania 
 




and Albanians in Kosovo, although separated by country and politics, largely retained their 
identity of being one people.  
The new Yugoslav federation had six republics: Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, 
Croatia, and Slovenia. Despite having an overwhelming majority of Albanians, Kosovo was 
never made a republic. In 1963, Yugoslavia declared two autonomous provinces: Kosovo and 
Vojvodina. This was solidified in 1974 with the new Yugoslav constitution. Autonomous 
provinces were not the same as republics. The main difference is that autonomous provinces 
lacked the right to secede. Even with Kosovo being granted the status of an autonomous 
province, the issue of Kosovo not being given the status of a republic never went away. Kosovo 
Albanians argued that Albanians were the majority within Kosovo. Serbians argued that 
Albanians in Kosovo were the minority within Serbia. After Josip Broz Tito died on 4 May 1980, 
the system began to fall apart. Judah contends that Tito was what was holding Yugoslavia 
together when he states that “[h]e was the ultimate arbitrator and boss.”86 After his death, the 
system began to fall apart. The 1980s were marked by renewed resistance and protests by 
Albanians in Kosovo.  
Slobodan Milošević 
 In 1987, Ivan Stambolić was the president of Serbia and Slobodan Milošević was a mid-
level official in Serbia’s Communist Party. This was the year Milošević was sent to Kosovo to 
listen to the complaints of Kosovo Serbs. Capitalizing on the ethnic tensions present between 
Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbians, Milošević made a speech in which he told Kosovo 
Serbians that, “no one should dare beat you.”87 The nationalist fervour that resulted from 
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Milošević’s visit led to his rise to power. Robert Austin exclaims that “[a]nyone who wants to 
see a man transformed in a moment need only watch the footage of Milosevic in Kosovo.”88 
Milošević continued to capitalize on tensions in Kosovo in order to consolidate his power. 
Milošević secured the resignation of Ivan Stambolić in 1987, priming himself for power. In 
1988, he exhumed the bones of Prince Lazar, who was killed at The Battle of Kosovo, and toured 
them throughout Kosovo. With Milošević’s instruction, the Serb National Assembly revoked 
Kosovo and Vojvodina’s autonomous status. To do so they needed the support of the provincial 
assemblies of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Milošević secured this support through a combination of 
jailing opponents and holding provincial assembly votes under duress. On 26 March, 1989, the 
Kosovo assembly, surrounded by tanks, ratified a new constitution. Kosovo was no longer an 
autonomous province. On 28 June, 1989, the 600th anniversary of The Battle of Kosovo, 
Milošević celebrated his political ascendancy with a charged speech in which he challenged 
political opponents in Serbia and Albanians in Kosovo. The importance of these events in 
Kosovo to the whole history of Yugoslavia cannot be over-stated. According to Malcolm, “[t]he 
Yugoslav crisis began in Kosovo and it will end in Kosovo.”89 Similarly, Austin states, “[w]hat 
happened in Kosovo sent Yugoslavia into a series of unending crises, and there is no doubt that 
Kosovo caused Yugoslavia's disintegrations.”90 Judah concurs and explains that “by stripping 
Kosovo of its autonomy and using tanks to do so, he [Milošević] instilled fear else-where, which 
in turn fueled the rise of nationalism in other parts of the country. In that sense, those who argue 
that the end of Yugoslavia began in Kosovo are right.”91 
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Distraction & Western Reaction  
 Western countries were too distracted by events in other parts of the world to give much 
attention to what was happening in Kosovo. As retired U.S. diplomat David L. Phillips says in 
his book Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention, “The United States was 
alarmed by Milosevic's speech but distracted by events elsewhere in the world. In September 
1989, East Germans overthrew their dictatorial government. The Berlin Wall was torn down two 
months later.”92 James Bartleman who served as the Canadian ambassador to the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) of NATO between 1990 and 1994 comments "the burgeoning crisis in 
Yugoslavia in 1989 and 1990 had initially been overshadowed by events occurring elsewhere in 
Europe [...] Milosevic's suppression of the rights of the two largest minority populations in 
Serbia, the Hungarians of Vojvodina and the Albanians of Kosovo, passed almost unnoticed."93 
Soon, the distraction was coming from within the Balkans itself. In the spring of 1991, both 
Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. In Slovenia there was a ten-day war between 
separatists and the Yugoslavia before the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army. The war in response 
to Croatia’s declaration of independence lasted significantly longer; it did not end until 1995. 
Bosnia declared independence in 1992, which initiated a bloody war with the Yugoslav army. 
Balkan historians suggest the wars throughout Yugoslavia kept Western countries from focusing 
on Kosovo. Judah explains this in stating, “[t]he collapse of Yugoslavia and the bloody events 
else-where simply eclipsed Kosovo. For years, little news filtered out of the province, not 
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because it was not accessible, but because what happened here simply could not compete in 
terms of news with what was happening elsewhere.”94  
On 15 January, 1992, Canada recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia from 
Yugoslavia, and then recognized the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 8 April, 1992. 
The first mention of Kosovo in the House of Commons was on 18 November, 1991, during a 
discussion on Croatia’s potential independence from Yugoslavia. Svend J. Robinson, a New 
Democratic Party Member of Parliament, mentioned the suffering of Kosovo Albanians: “We 
know that the Albanian majority in Kosovo has been brutally repressed for too long.”95 On 24 
December, 1992, U.S. President George Bush issued his “Christmas Warning” to Serbia. The 
“Christmas Warning” was a memo sent to Milošević which read, “in the event of conflict in 
Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the U.S. will be prepared to employ military force against 
Serbians in Kosovo and Serbia proper.”96 Robinson’s comment to Parliament and Bush’s 
Christmas Warning may suggest that Kosovo was not as eclipsed as Judah suggests. 
Unfortunately, these were only brief moments in which Kosovo was on the radar and 
overall, Judah’s assessment is still accurate. In the years between 1989 and 1995, Kosovo was 
rarely mentioned in Canadian media and was only mentioned a handful of times in the House of 
Commons. As the situation continued to escalate in Kosovo, the international community’s 
attention was occupied with Bosnia, while Canada’s attention was occupied with Quebec. Lloyd 
Axworthy, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1996 to 2000, comments in his memoir 
that, “Kosovo was ignored” in order to “keep Milošević on side” and to find a resolution for the 
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conflict in Bosnia.97 When brought up in the House of Commons, it was always as a part of a 
larger comment on the state of Slovenia, Croatia, or Bosnia. The plight of Kosovo Albanians was 
largely ignored. This is illustrated in comments made by two Members of Parliament on 25 
January, 1994. While discussing Bosnia, Liberal Member of Parliament David Berger praised 
“[t]he international effort [that] has also successfully prevented the conflict from spilling over 
into the neighbouring republics of Macedonia and Kosovo.”98 Progressive Conservative Member 
of Parliament Jean Charest commented, “[w]e should recognize that some of the successes we 
have had that have been quite significant. The strategic objective of preventing the spillover of 
hostilities into other regions, such as Kosovo, has so far been achieved.”99 These statements aptly 
illustrate how growing tensions in Kosovo were overlooked in discussions that surrounded other 
issues in Yugoslavia.  
From Passive to Armed Resistance  
 In response to the loss of their rights and many of their freedoms, Kosovo Albanians went 
“underground.” This meant that they created a parallel government within Kosovo and ran 
services and institutions like doctors’ offices, elections, schools, and tax collection out of 
peoples’ homes. The Albanians opted for passive resistance to Serbian rule. The parallel 
government was led by the elected leader Ibrahim Rugova who was a pacifist and feared that any 
violence on the part of Kosovo Albanians would bring stronger reprisals from the Serbian 
regime. In 1991, this underground government held a secret referendum on independence. When 
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89 percent of the vote came out in favour, they declared independence. This first declaration of 
independence was only ever recognized by Albania. 
 In 1995, twenty-one days of talks between the leaders of Yugoslavia took place in 
Dayton, Ohio. Despite lobbying and protests, there was no Albanian representation. The 
resulting Dayton Peace Accord made no mention of Kosovo. On the subject, retired U.S. State 
department official Morton I. Abramowitz recalls, “[l]eaving Kosovo off the agenda was a very 
practical decision. People are very practical, especially in democracies. In the end, we had to 
fight again because we didn't solve Kosovo.”100 Despite being assured that the time for Kosovo 
would come, Kosovo Albanians responded passionately to being left out of Dayton. Ibrahim 
Rugova, the ‘Gandhi of the Balkans,’ and his policies of passive resistance became increasingly 
less popular with Kosovo Albanians.101 Austin explains, “[i]n 1988, the Albanians opted for 
passive resistance to Serbia, Gandhi-style. This worked only until 1995, when the Dayton Peace 
for Bosnia failed to even mention Kosovo.”102 After Dayton, many Kosovo Albanians turned 
their hopes to armed resistance. Thus, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was formed. In his 
memoir, Axworthy laments that the message this sent to Kosovo Albanians was that they were 
being abandoned by the international community.103 Axworthy’s assessment is correct. This 
message was driven home when Jakup Krasniqi, a founding member of the KLA, was 
interviewed by David L. Phillips for his book Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U. S. 
Intervention, during which Krasniqi confirms the role Dayton played in the call to arms by 
Kosovo Albanians. Krasniqi explains that “leaving Kosovo in Yugoslavia was a compromise to 
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get Serbia's cooperation on Bosnia.”104  According to Krasniqi, the lesson from Slovenia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia was “if you do not fight for your country no one will care about you.”105 
Canadian historian Michael Manulak plainly states that the Dayton accords “implicitly 
reinforced Serb sovereignty over Kosovo as a quid pro quo for Milosevic’s support of the Balkan 
peace process.”106 
The second factor that dramatically changed the situation was the economic collapse of 
Albania. In 1996, Albania saw the collapse of a large-scale financial pyramid scheme which led 
to the breakdown of the government. During this crisis in Albania, armouries went unguarded 
and large amounts of small-arms and anti-tank weapons made their way into the hands of the 
KLA. Thus, the feeling of abandonment by the West, combined with access to arms, led to a 
dramatic change in Kosovo; from passive to armed resistance. Consequently, the attention of 
both the international community and Canada had no choice but to return to Kosovo.   
Ibrahim Rugova’s prediction that passive resistance would bring rights to Kosovo 
Albanians proved to be incorrect. However, his prediction that violent resistance by Kosovo 
Albanians would be met with an even more violent reaction by Serbia was correct. The four 
years following the Dayton talks were marked by increased resistance by Kosovo Albanians and 
increased activity by the KLA. In the words of Austin, “…Albanians realized that Mao was a 
better role model than Gandhi.”107 The increased resistance was subsequently met with brutal 
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and violent actions by Serbia. Such escalation brought the attention of the world, including that 
of Canada, back to the place where it all began: Kosovo.  
Part 2: Canada’s Involvement 
Contact Group 
As the crisis in Bosnia began to cool down and the crisis in Kosovo began to heat up, 
attention turned towards Kosovo. It was during this time that the Contact Group was revived. 
The Contact Group, which was originally formed during the War in Bosnia, consisted of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia. Despite being a member 
of the G7 from which the Contact Group was formed, Canada was not included. Canada’s 
absence from the Contact Group was a source of contention. In response to the criticisms of 
opposition Members of Parliament over Canada’s absence from the Contact Group, Prime 
Minister Chrétien defensively stated, “[t]his Contact Group has existed for a long time. It was 
mainly made up of people from Europe. We cannot have a Contact Group of 19. We are kept 
informed of every element of the proceedings. We play the role that Canada is able to play.”108 A 
different story is told by Paul Heinbecker, Canada’s ambassador to Germany during the Kosovo 
War. In Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Handbook for Canada, Heinbecker argues 
that Canada had to fight for influence and that much of his diplomatic career was spent pushing 
himself into rooms Canada was not welcome in.109 Heinbecker uses Kosovo as an example of 
when Canada lacked international influence when he reminisces: 
For example, when a “contact group,” comprising the US, the UK, France, Italy, 
and Russia, was established to run the diplomacy of the Kosovo War, all G8 
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members except Canada and Japan were included (the Japanese were expected 
just to help pay the bills as they had done in the Gulf War). We were the only two 
excluded. The first meeting was held in Germany, and, as ambassador there at the 
time, I insisted on a place for Canada on the grounds that we had been part of the 
defence of Germany for the previous forty years at a very substantial cost, and our 
dedication to European security was evident in the cemeteries across Europe 
where Canadian soldiers lay buried.110 
 
Eventually, Heinbecker’s pleas were enough to ‘embarrass’ the Germans into inviting Canada to 
attend the Contact Group’s first meeting, however not enough to join the Contact Group. To 
Heinbecker’s dismay, Canada declined the invitation.111  
Coercion & Diplomacy 
In 1997, a meeting of all the NATO countries took place in Brussels. Out of this meeting 
came a communique in which for the first time NATO announced its engagement on the Kosovo 
issue. In June 1998, NATO began shows of air force over Albania and Macedonia and began to 
prepare its military base in Aviano, Italy in an effort to intimidate Milošević. Two months later, 
NATO Secretary General Javier Solana announced that NATO had military plans and were 
prepared to “act swiftly and effectively [in Kosovo] should the need arise.”112 In the same month, 
NATO defence ministers approved an activation warning, which allowed commanders to begin 
identifying potential military targets in Yugoslavia. This course of actions on the part of NATO 
is described by Manulak as an effort to “turn the screws in its efforts to persuade Milošević to 
moderate his forces actions.”113   
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These coercive measures, such as “turning the screws” on Milošević, were happening 
parallel to diplomatic measures. As early as 1996, diplomats were voicing their concerns during 
their visits to Yugoslavia. By 1998, U.S. diplomats Richard Holbrooke and Chris Hill were 
regularly meeting with Milošević in an effort to settle the Kosovo issue. The efforts of American 
diplomats were reinforced by diplomats of other countries including Canada. For example, 
Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy visited Yugoslavia and brought up Canadian 
concerns over the treatment of Kosovo Albanians. In March of 1998, Canada sent Jim Wright, 
the Director General for central, east and south Europe at the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (DFAIT), to meet with Milošević and urge cooperation on the Kosovo issue. 
Following this meeting, Canada placed economic sanctions on Yugoslavia. The objectives of 
these efforts were reinforced on 23 September, 1998 through UN Security Council Resolution 
1199. This security resolution reaffirmed “the right of all refugees and displaced persons to 
return to their homes in safety, and underlining the responsibility of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia for creating the conditions which allow them to do so” and “condemned the 
escalating violence in Kosovo.”114 It also condemned violence by “all parties involved” and 
demanded rights for Kosovo Albanians.  
The ineffectiveness of these efforts was exposed when, only three days after the UN 
Security Council Resolution, Serbian special police massacred Kosovo Albanian civilians in the 
village of Abria e Epërme / Gornje Obrinje. Following this massacre, Holbrooke was 
immediately sent to Belgrade to demand compliance from Milošević. At the same time, U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright convened a secret meeting of the Contact Group’s foreign 
ministers at London’s Heathrow Airport. This meeting resulted in a NATO activation order 
 




announced on 13 October, 1998. The activation order meant NATO was prepared to launch an 
air campaign within four days. Historians credit this activation order for the headway Holbrooke 
was able to make in his negotiations with Milošević. Manulak explains that “armed with what he 
considered a credible threat, Holbrooke reached an agreement with Milošević within hours.”115 
The agreement Holbrooke and Milošević reached was the creation of the Organisation for 
Security in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). 
Kosovo Verification Mission 
 The OSCE KVM launched in December 1998. As part of the mission, 2000 unarmed 
civilian monitors were allowed into Kosovo. These monitors were responsible for maintaining a 
ceasefire and seeing the peaceful return of 100,000 internally displaced refugees to their homes. 
Milošević also agreed to withdraw the bulk of his paramilitary forces from Kosovo. On 24 
October, 1998, these terms were written in UN Security Council Resolution 1203. Under the 
KVM, Kosovo was split into five regional centres. Canada provided the head of Regional Centre 
1 located in Prizren. Canada provided three million dollars in financial support as well as one 
hundred verifiers which ranged from serving and retired military personnel, police officers, and 
other civilian professionals. There were also Canadian law and human rights experts working in 
the OSCE KVM offices.  
              On 15 January, 1999, forty-five dead Kosovo Albanians were found in the village of 
Reçak / Račak. This massacre is widely credited as the turning point for the international 
community’s involvement in Kosovo. Axworthy states, “[m]atters came to a head early in the 
new year when Serb Militia massacred civilians in the town of Racak.”116 Manulak explains the 
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evidence had been obvious well before Reçak / Račak, when he states that “despite the presence 
of credible indicators and formal feedback mechanisms, it was a focussing event, the January 
1999 massacre in the village of Račak, which brought the Kosovo problem to the Canadian 
government agenda.”117 The cat was truly out of the bag when, after visiting the scene, the head 
of the OSCE mission, William Walker, addressed the media without the permission of 
Holbrooke, the Contact Group, OSCE, or the U.S. State Department and stated that Reçak / 
Račak was an “unspeakable atrocity [and a] crime very much against humanity.”118 U.S. 
diplomats James Pardew and Christopher Hill were immediately sent to meet with Milošević. 
When this meeting turned out to be fruitless, the North Atlantic Council sent the Supreme Allied 
Commander General Wesley Clark and the chair of its military committee, General Klaus 
Naumann. Milošević was still obstinate and inspired by the success at Dayton, negotiations were 
convened in the French town of Rambouillet.  
Rambouillet Conference 
From 6 February, 1999 to 22 March, 1999, the Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo was 
held in France. At this conference, members of the Contact Group on Kosovo – the United 
States, the United Kingdom. France, Germany, Italy, and Russia – met with representatives from 
Yugoslavia and Kosovo to find a solution to the escalating ethnic tensions. The accord presented 
at Rambouillet would have granted Kosovo significant autonomy, however, still within 
Yugoslavia for three years. After three years, an international conference would have to be held 
to reach a final settlement. Other features included the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from 
Kosovo with only a small police force remaining, and a multinational peace force which would 
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ensure KLA disarmament. Milošević himself did not attend the conference. On 22 March, 1999, 
Holbrooke delivered an ultimatum to Milošević. This effort was futile. On that same day, when 
Yugoslavia refused to sign the accord, the negotiations at Rambouillet ended in failure. Two 
days later on 24 March, 1999, Canada and its NATO allies were at war against Yugoslavia.  
Canada was not invited to Rambouillet and Manulak argues that “[f]oreign affairs was 
extremely skeptical of the contact group and the Rambouillet exercise.”119 Despite previous 
insistence on UN approval, on 24 March, 1999, Canada was dropping bombs on Serbia along 
with the rest of NATO. When historian Adam Chapnick comments about Kosovo in his book 
Canada on the United Nations Security Council: A Small Power on a Large Stage, he 
emphasises that Canada was unsuccessful in its lobbying efforts to have the Security Council 
involved in a resolution for Kosovo. Chapnick explains that “Kosovo did not, however, dominate 
the Security Council after the first few days of February. With Kofi Annan’s tacit approval, the 
real debate shifted to NATO and, later, to the G8... After further unsuccessful Canadian efforts to 
Security Council authorization, members of NATO, Canada included, bypassed the council.”120 
All the time leading up to and during Rambouillet, Canada was pursuing the possibility of a 
“uniting for peace” resolution to convene an urgent meeting of the United Nations General 
Assembly. As part of this lobbying, Axworthy and Heinbecker made multiple trips to the United 
Nations in New York to build support. In the lead up to the Rambouillet Conference, Canada had 
argued ardently that no military action be taken without a UN Security Council resolution. 
However, it was decided by NATO that Russia and China’s support for Yugoslavia would make 
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a UN Security Council resolution impossible to obtain. Like the Contact Group’s efforts at 
Rambouillet, Canada’s efforts were unsuccessful, thus leading to Canada’s participation in 
seventy-eight days of bombing Serbia.   
The diplomatic efforts NATO and the United Nations engaged in have been the subject of 
much criticism. Some of the criticism is valid and some less so. The major criticism is that the 
extended and fruitless negotiating with Milošević, with multiple warnings and ultimatums, gave 
Yugoslavia the chance to prepare for potential war.  The diplomats involved admit this failure. 
Richard Holbrooke called the events in Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, “the greatest collective 
failure of the West since the 1930s.”121 Lloyd Axworthy included a lengthy condemnation of the 
diplomatic failures both at Rambouillet and at the United Nations Security Council in his book:   
The Rambouillet conference, held in a chateau outside Paris, was the Contact 
Group's last hurrah, a final stab at bringing the protagonists together. Except 
they never met face to face - all the discussions were through third parties. The 
conference failed, illustrating the inadequacy of last-minute, ad hoc diplomatic 
efforts undertaken without the proper representation of interests. This badly 
managed diplomatic manoeuvre underlined for many of us the reactive nature of 
the international community to humanitarian crises. The failure of the UN 
Security Council was exacting yet another toll in human lives. The fact that 
Milosevic had far exceeded in his brutality any right to claim impunity from 
international action should have been recognized and acted upon by the Security 
Council, which effectively abdicated its role as the central agency for protecting 
people.122  
 
Much of the criticism of the diplomatic efforts is valid, reinforced by the fact the criticism comes 
from the diplomats themselves. However, despite this criticism, it is important to remember what 
the diplomats were up against. For example, there is criticism that Western diplomats were too 
chummy with Milošević. In his book, Phillips quotes Holbrooke admitting he had to be friendly 
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with Milošević as a negotiating tactic; however, he quotes Holbrooke saying, “I felt like washing 
my hands every time I came out of a meeting with Milosevic.”123 The same sentiment is found in 
Axworthy’s reflections on his meetings with Milošević. Axworthy stated that in all of his time as 
Foreign Minister “there was three or four people that I’ve met that you could truly call evil, he 
[Milošević] was one of them.”124 Axworthy went on to explain that he had many private 
meetings with all sorts of world leaders and had been a street politician for over twenty years 
when he met Milošević. Axworthy recalled, “I was used to dealing with all kinds and all sorts 
but sometimes you’d just run up on somebody and just say this person just is bad.”125 Axworthy 
ended his reflections on his meetings with Milošević by stating simply, “it’s a big statement to 
make, but it’s true.”126 This type of reflection by seasoned diplomats such as Holbrooke and 
Axworthy is very telling. It illustrates what the diplomats trying to solve the crisis in Kosovo 
were up against.  
The Kosovo War  
 Despite over a year of posturing by NATO, on 24 March, 1999, the war started, albeit 
with more of a rumble than a bang. This was due to a combination of bad weather, casualty 
aversion, and hyper-vigilant target setting. The unimpressive start was so toned down that 
“lovers strolled down riverbanks and ate at outdoor cafes and watched fireworks.”127 Axworthy 
explains that foreign ministers, himself included, set limits on targets in order to keep civilian 
casualties to a minimum. He comments, “[i]t was undoubtedly frustrating for the military people 
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[...] but necessary as one of the defining elements of a humanitarian intervention.”128 
Unfortunately, one of the unintended consequences was that the war lasted much longer than 
NATO expected. This allowed more Kosovo Albanians to be killed or forced out of Kosovo. It 
also led to a lack of supplies and fatigue amongst NATO countries. Manulak writes, “as the air 
campaign began, Yugoslav forces unleashed a well-planned campaign of ethnic cleansing.”129 
Canada contributed eighteen CF-18s, dropped 532 bombs and half a million pounds of 
explosives, and represented 10 percent of the missions flown in Kosovo. The Kosovo War was 
the first time Canadian pilots flew combat missions since the Korean War. There was remarkable 
cohesion in the support for the Kosovo War in Canada. Opinion polls showed the public’s 
support, the Canadian government had unanimous support within parliament, and there was 
favourable media coverage. It was only as the war dragged on that the support dwindled, with 
members of the New Democratic Party eventually withdrawing support and calling for 
negotiations with Milošević.  
 As the war progressed, NATO’s willingness to intensify its military pressure on Belgrade 
progressed as well. NATO doubled the number of planes, loosened restrictions on targets, and 
public talk of using ground forces ensued. Lovers were no longer strolling in the streets. The 
final nail in the coffin was Russian President Boris Yeltsin telling Milošević that in the event of a 
ground war Russia would not come to Yugoslavia’s defence. On 11 June, 1999, the Kosovo War 
ended when NATO and Yugoslavia signed UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Axworthy 
describes the Canadian role by saying, “the Canadian delegation found itself playing middleman 
in drafting an acceptable compromise, conveying to the Security Council the need to have a 
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resolution enacted immediately.”130 However, it is important to note that the Resolution was not 
negotiated at the United Nations Security Council. The Resolution was negotiated and drafted at 
the Cologne, Germany G8 meeting. As Axworthy recalls, “It was an amusing tableau to see the 
G-8 ministers sitting around the conference table, each with a cellphone to the ear, instructing 
their UN ambassadors in very undiplomatic language to get a resolution drafted and accepted 
post-haste.”131  
UN Security Resolution 1244  
 The UN Security Resolution 1244 outlined that Serbia would withdraw its forces and the 
KLA would demilitarize. The administrative, judicial, executive, and legislative authority was 
given to the newly created United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). 
Militarily and policing duties were given to the newly created Kosovo Force (KFOR). KFOR is 
the NATO led peacekeeping force which operated inside of Kosovo when the bombing campaign 
ended, which Russia was also involved in. Canada’s participation in KFOR, called Operation 
Kinetic, lasted from June 1999 to June 2000. Kosovo was divided into five operational sectors 
with each of the Contact Group, except Russia, getting a sector. However, operating areas where 
Russia had control were outlined. Canada's KFOR soldiers operated within the British sector and 
included a tactical helicopter squadron, an armoured reconnaissance squadron, and a mechanized 
infantry battle group.132 Many authors note that UN Security Resolution 1244 was unclear. Judah 
explains that “the resolution had been aimed at ending the bombing, so it was contradictory and, 
in key parts, unclear.”133 Austin similarly maintains that “riddled with contradictory language, 
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this agreement would in the end do enormous harm to Kosovo…”134 The main contradiction is 
that Security Council Resolution 1244 both reaffirmed the “sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,”135 but also demanded adherence to the Rambouillet 
accords which outlined determination by the will of the people. With the question of how and 
why Kosovo came to be a top agenda item in countries all over the world answered, this thesis 
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CHAPTER III: DIASPORA DISCONTENT  
“No nation like Canada can do what its citizens of Sri Lankan or Pakistani or Somalian or Jewish 
or Muslim or Ukrainian origin want – all the time. No nation like Canada can do what its 
provinces, or founding peoples, or some of them may want – all the time. A nation must do what 
its national interests determine it must. And that requires that a nation like Canada know what its 
national interests are.”  
- J.L. Granatstein, "Multiculturalism and Canadian Foreign Policy" in The World in 
Canada: Diaspora, Demography, and Domestic Politics 
“Just as we have been in the forefront of creating a multicultural society, so too could we be at 
the forefront of thinking through how to create a foreign policy that can respond to that reality.” 
- Jennifer M. Welsh, "Canada's Foreign Policy: Does the Public Have a Say?" quoted in 
The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics, and Canada's Global 
Posture 
“Diaspora politics therefore deserves a special place in any discussion on Canada’s foreign 
policy because it occupies a kind of “grey zone” of political propriety”  
- David Carment and Joseph Landry “Diaspora and Canadian Foreign Policy: The World 
in Canada" in the edited collection The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: 
Parliament, Politics, and Canada's Global Posture 
 
According to the most recent census, more than one in five Canadians are foreign-born.136 A 
further two in five Canadian children have an immigrant background.137 According to David 
Carment and Joseph Landry, the editors of The World in Canada: Diaspora, Demography, and 
Domestic Politics, members of diaspora communities in Canada can include “ethnic migrants, 
first-, second-, or even third-generation immigrants, as well as expatriates, students, guest 
workers, and refugees.”138 Thus, presently more than half of Canadians belong to a diaspora 
community. Though the percentage of immigrants has varied throughout history, with the lowest 
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percentage being between 14.7% to 16.1%, Canada has always been a country of immigrants.139 
Canadians have always maintained ties to their homelands, starting with English and French 
citizens from what are considered the two founding nations and continuing on to the present day 
with 260 nationalities represented. 
 The reality that Canada is a country of immigrants has led to the diaspora communities 
influence on Canadian foreign policy garnering an ever-increasing amount of scholarly attention. 
When scholars write about diaspora influences on Canadian foreign policy, the focus has mostly 
been on cases of successful lobbying efforts. This means that the bulk of the literature focuses on 
Chinese, Indian, Ukrainian, Jewish, and Armenian diasporas in Canada. Much of the scholarship 
focuses on the success of diaspora lobbying during the tenure of Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper’s conservative government. With the bar set at successful attempts at influence, lobbying 
during the Kosovo War has been infrequently mentioned and has never thoroughly been studied 
by scholars. Even though neither the Albanian-Canadian nor the Serbian-Canadian diasporas 
were overly successful at lobbying the government during the Kosovo War, their efforts merit 
scholarly attention for a few crucial reasons. First, Canada's demographics and domestic pressure 
from diaspora groups during the Kosovo War differed drastically from its most important allies, 
specifically the United States. Therefore, a study of the Albanian-Canadian nor the Serbian-
Canadian diasporas during the Kosovo War helps distinguish Canada from its NATO allies and 
illustrates the unique considerations Canada had in the creation of its foreign policy. Second, a 
study of Albanian-Canadian diaspora activity during the Kosovo War shows that not all 
diasporas are created equal. It exemplifies the economic, political, and social barriers newer 
 





diaspora groups have in establishing their influence. Third, there is consensus among the 
politicians and policy advisers closest to the Chrétien government that diaspora groups have 
impacted Canadian governments, regardless of political party. Politicians such as Bill Graham 
and Lloyd Axworthy specifically note the role of diaspora lobbying during the Kosovo War. 
Fourth, although the Serbian-Canadian diaspora was engaged in lobbying the government during 
multiple Yugoslav crises in the 1990s, the Kosovo War was different. As such, it deserves 
singular attention. Fifth, the fact that Canada continued its actions in Kosovo, despite the size 
and impact of its Serbian-Canadian diaspora, demonstrates the depth of Canada’s commitment to 
its human security agenda. Sixth, the Serbian-Canadian efforts to influence foreign policy during 
the Kosovo War took many forms, from petitions to protests to personal pleas. Seventh, the non-
diaspora Canadian reaction to Serbian protests during the Kosovo War was harsh and critical of 
multi-culturalism. A study of the Kosovo War illustrates the limits of multi-cultural values 
among Canadians. Finally, although neither diaspora group active during the Kosovo War 
impacted foreign policy to the extent they would have liked to, diaspora lobbying did have an 
impact on top level decision making during the Kosovo War. In summation, a study of the 
actions of the Albanian-Canadian and the Serbian-Canadian diasporas in Canada during the 
Kosovo War exemplifies the close relationship between domestic issues and foreign policy. It 
also provides crucial insight into the advantages, disadvantages, and challenges associated with 
being a nation of immigrants.   
Canada & The U.S.: Contrasting Demographics  
David L. Phillips’ Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention is, at its 
core, a history of statecraft and U.S. politics in Kosovo. The third chapter of Liberating Kosovo 




diaspora played in U.S. politics during the Kosovo War.140 The chapter opens with the 
pronouncement that, “Albanian émigrés have always played a critical role in Albanian 
politics.”141 According to Phillips, throughout history the Albanian diaspora has been involved in 
the politics of their homeland more so than other diaspora communities. The influence of the 
Albanian diaspora in the United States cannot be understated. First started in 1882, Phillips 
contends that, “The Albanian-American diaspora became a force in U.S. politics, raising funds 
and mobilizing political support for Kosovo’s pro-independence movement. The community was 
well-known and influential in Washington circles.”142 The depth of commitment to Albanian 
issues was exemplified in the 1990s when Albanian-Americans, sometimes third generation, paid 
taxes to the shadow government being run out of houses in Kosovo.143 This depth of 
commitment was only heightened as the crisis in Kosovo reached its boiling point. When the 
KLA formed in Kosovo, Albanian-Americans raised funds to support the efforts. In one case, at 
a meeting at Bruno’s Restaurant in New York, a table was covered in $1.6 million dollars in cash 
to buy weapons for the KLA.144 Albanian-Americans were, however, willing to give more than 
cash. Some of them gave up their lives. In 1999, the “Atlantic Brigade” formed, consisting of fire 
fighters from the Bronx who went to Kosovo to fight for the KLA.145  
Albanian-Americans not only influenced the politics of their homeland: they were well 
organized and influenced the politics of the United States as well. Ever the pragmatists, this 
meant forming connections with both Democrats and Republicans over the years. Some leading 
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Albanian-Americans would make equally large donations to both parties during campaigns to 
achieve this end.146 The 1990s saw a concerted effort by Albanian-Americans to put Kosovo on 
the U.S. policy agenda, with the creation of numerous lobby groups and organizations including 
the Albanian American Civil League (AACL), the Albanian Youth of Kosovo in the Free World, 
the Albanian American Public Affairs Committee (AAPAC), and the Albanian American 
Foundation.147 Their efforts were aided by the fact that Albanians had been in America long 
enough that there were members of congress who traced their roots back to Albania. For 
example, Congressman Joseph J. DioGuardi, who became instrumental in bringing attention to 
Kosovo during both the Bush and the Clinton administrations, was the son of an Italian 
immigrant, who identified as “Arberesh”, meaning he (DioGuardi’s father) had come from a 
village in Italy where Albanians had lived for hundreds of years. The resounding scope and 
success of the influence of Albanian-Americans has been well documented in numerous books, 
including Be Not Afraid, For You Have Sons in America: How a Brooklyn Roofer Helped Lure 
the U.S. into the Kosovo War by Newsweek journalist Stacy Sullivan.148  
The situation could not have been more different north of the 49th parallel. Whereas 
Richard Holbrooke was meeting with Albanian-Americans every six weeks in 1998, and then 
with increasing frequency while the Kosovo crisis escalated,149 neither Lloyd Axworthy, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs for Canada, nor Bill Graham, the chair of the Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT), recall hearing Albanian-Canadian voices 
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during the Kosovo crisis.150 This is unsurprising when one considerers the difference in 
demographics between the United States and Canada. According to the 2000 United States 
Census, 113,661 Albanians lived in America.151 The accuracy of this tally is suspect, though, 
with scholars suggesting that the number could have been closer to 500 000.152 153 In sharp 
contrast, in 1996, there were 4140 Albanians living in Canada.154 As with the case of Albanian-
Americans, the more accurate number is likely higher. However, even the highest estimates only 
place between five and eight thousand Albanians in Canada at the time, which still pales in 
comparison to the number in the U.S.155 Whether one trusts the official census data or the higher 
numbers, what is clear is that Canada and the United States had drastically different 
demographics when it came to the number of Albanians in their respective countries.156 Canada 
was not only unique in comparison to the U.S., as Judah points out that other NATO countries, 
namely Germany, Greece, Turkey, and Italy, also had large populations of Albanians.157  
One might assume that since Canada had significantly fewer Albanians, it would also 
have fewer Serbians. Thus, Canada’s demography would mirror that of the United States, albeit 
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on a smaller scale. That assumption would be false. According to the 1996 census, Canada had 
40,200 Serbians. Another, 66,940 identified as Yugoslav.158 By 1996, Macedonia, Bosnia, 
Croatia, and Slovenia had left Yugoslavia, and Albanians were unlikely to willingly identify with 
Yugoslavia. This suggests that respondents who identified as Yugoslav were likely from Serbia 
or Montenegro. Furthermore, the majority of people from Montenegro, who would identify as 
“Yugoslav”, would likely have been Serbian. Thus, an accurate estimate of Canada’s Serbian 
population, based on the 1996 census, was around 107,140. Again, the numbers are likely higher. 
By the time of the Kosovo War in 1999, the Serbian National Shield Society in Canada estimated 
about 250,000 Serbians lived in Canada.159 Thus, using the highest estimates from 1999, Canada 
had 8000 Albanians and 250,000 Serbians, a stark difference. In comparison, and again using the 
highest estimate from 1999, the United States had a roughly equal number of Albanians and 
Serbians, around 500,000 each.160 Despite having roughly equal numbers, the Albanian- and 
Serbian-American communities did not have equal advocacy power and ability to influence 
foreign policy in the United States. Albanian-Americans had much more advocacy power. 
Former American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, put it plainly when he 
stated that, “Serbian-Americans were not particularly influential.”161 Thus, the relevant 
demographic makeup of the United States and Canada differed drastically during the Kosovo 
War. This shows that Canada did, in fact, have unique considerations when making decisions 
and considering their alliance obligations during the Kosovo War. Canada’s unique domestic 
considerations, such as the imbalance between diaspora advocacy, has received little to no 
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attention in the previous literature. This is especially surprising given that the literature on 
Canada’s role in the Kosovo crisis is strongly pre-occupied with distinguishing Canada from its 
allies during the Kosovo War.  
Easily Forgotten: The Albanian-Canadian Diaspora in 1999 
The only mention of the Canadian-Albanian diaspora in the literature is in Manulak’s 
Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: An Agenda for Intervention, in which he states, “[t]he Albanian 
Canadian diaspora community only numbered about 5000 and was not an important advocacy 
force."162 This sentiment is shared by Axworthy and Graham as well. Both Axworthy and 
Graham include the role of the Serbian diaspora during the Kosovo War in their political 
memoirs. Neither of them mentions the Albanian diaspora. This, however, does not mean that 
Albanians in Canada did not attempt to influence Canadian foreign policy. The few Albanians 
who did reside in Canada formed smaller and less effective organizations than those in the U.S. 
For example, the underground shadow government run by Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo had a 
Canadian branch in Toronto called the “Democratic Union of Kosovo”.163 In March 1998, the 
leader of the Canadian branch of the Kosovo Albanian government-in-exile, Agim Hadri, 
together with Ferzi Bekiri of the Albanian-Canadian Community Association, sent impassioned 
letters and petitions to Axworthy pleading for Canadian action on the Kosovo issue. One letter 
stated that, “Every day there are more accounts of atrocities the Serbs are inflicting on our 
families and friends. Every day the newspapers are filled with new horror stories and of more 
deaths. We are certain you share our fear that . . . the torture and the massacres are but the 
beginning of another ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.”164 This was part of a campaign by 
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Albanian-Canadians to urge Canada to bring “an immediate, internationally enforced end to the 
conflict."165 Three months after the letter was sent, Axworthy responded in a letter in which he 
denounced both sides, Milošević and the Kosovo separatists who he says were engaging in 
“terrorism.” According to Toronto Star journalist, Haroon Siddiqui, in this response Axworthy 
“makes the same mistake as the Europeans: draw a moral equivalency between the Serbs and 
their victims. That's what Gen. Lewis MacKenzie also did in Bosnia, and landed Canada on the 
wrong side of history.”166 Axworthy’s letter, along with the attempts by Albanian-Canadians 
which were notably limited in their size and scope, was not impactful enough for Axworthy to 
recall any Albanian activity when asked.167 This is due to the Albanian-Canadian community 
lacking the advocacy power to truly influence the Canadian political process, especially in 
foreign policy. The type of advocacy power needed for influence is described by Manulak as the 
“intensity of opinion, often from the frequency and vigour of communications. In addition to the 
intensity of expression, officials evaluate the relative advocacy power of actors based on political 
resources, group cohesion, electoral mobilization, and economic clout.”168 The Albanian-
Canadian community in the 1990s did not have the factors, as outlined by Manulak, to influence 
Canadian foreign policy.  
There is another important factor worth assessing not listed by Manulak: media attention. 
To its credit, the media did, after some time, try to represent Albanian-Canadian voices. This was 
especially true when the NATO bombing campaign started, and journalists clamored to find 
Albanian-Canadians with family members in Kosovo to interview. One Toronto Star story titled, 
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“Brother killed by Serbs, Ontario man says ; 'They shot them, and left them to die by the wall” 
interviewed an Albanian-Canadian with family in Kosovo and then discusses the Albanian-
Canadian community in Canada more generally. The article specifically mentions a fundraiser 
hosted by the Albanian-Canadian community to support refugees fleeing Kosovo at which thirty 
thousand dollars was collected in the first hour. The impact of diasporas in Canada sending 
money to their homeland should not be understated. Axworthy explains, “a lot of the new 
communities provide very substantial reparations back to their home regions. I mean it’s larger 
than our overseas development assistance programs.”169 It goes on to tell of the Albanian 
Canadian Association members being appointed to canvass homes across the Greater Toronto 
Area to bring awareness for the cause.170 However, as explained by Robert C. Austin of the 
University of Toronto, the media’s efforts were not without fault. Austin was a research associate 
with the Titan Group for Public Policy Analysis and the Albania analyst for CBC News. He was 
one of the leading experts in Canada in the 1990s on Albanian issues. Austin distinctly 
remembers one news interview that he describes as proof that, “the Serbs had a huge advantage 
in this diaspora politics.”171 Austin recalls being struck by an interview in which “they show this 
Serb diaspora guy and he’s in his library with books lining the walls … and then they interview 
this Albanian guy and he was in a fish restaurant, like he was the cook, he had an apron on. I 
always thought - wow - was that purposeful?”172 Austin recognizes that “the Albanian diaspora 
was relatively new [and] didn’t have the financial resources” but maintains this type of media 
portrayal did not do them any favours.173 This assessment is similar to Manulak’s assertion that 
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advocacy power depends on “political resources, group cohesion, electoral mobilization, and 
economic clout.” The Albanian community in Canada may not have been large enough, nor 
economically or politically powerful enough, to meet the threshold required to have advocacy 
power in Canadian politics. However, as evidenced above, they understood the importance of the 
diaspora in advocating for policy in their host countries and attempted to pool their limited 
resources to do so.  
Foreign Policy Potential: Consensus Among Experts 
Similarly, the importance of diaspora communities in Canadian politics and foreign 
policy is well-recognized by those most familiar with then Prime Minister Chrétien’s foreign 
policy such as Lloyd Axworthy, Bill Graham, Paul Heinbecker, and Eddie Goldenberg. Lloyd 
Axworthy served as Minister of Employment and Immigration in Chrétien's cabinet from 1993 to 
1996 when he was made the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Chrétien chose Axworthy as one of the 
"shooting stars" in his cabinet.174 These were experienced politicians who had previously shown 
their mettle and could be trusted in the most important positions.175 Axworthy served as the 
Minister of Employment and Immigration in Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s Cabinet. Axworthy 
later held two portfolios in Chrétien’s Cabinet, first as Minister of Immigration then as Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. Axworthy’s cabinet positions gave him important insight into the importance 
of immigrants and diaspora communities in Canadian politics. In Navigating a New World: 
Canada’s Global Future, Axworthy writes about the critical importance of diaspora communities 
in Canada to foreign policy. In a discussion of the power of NGOs in lobbying the government, 
Axworthy notes, “Often these groups are organized among the diaspora of the cultural group in 
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question, taking on the cause of their homeland in their new surroundings."176 Axworthy explains 
what he calls “the phenomenon of dual loyalty”, where, “a group takes on the rights issue of its 
native soil and applies pressure through Canadian institutions."177 Axworthy asserts that, 
“Canada's cultural interest groups and NGOs have come to be key influences in making foreign 
trouble spots and human crises part and parcel of domestic political scene. Given the increasing 
pluralism of our society, they are a major factor in setting our foreign policy. [emphasis 
added]"178 By recognizing cultural interest groups as a “key influence,” Axworthy underscores 
two crucial points. The first is that domestic issues and foreign policy are inextricably linked. 
The second is the potential for influence that cultural groups have in Canada. Axworthy argues 
that there is an unrealized foreign policy potential that the Canadian government should 
capitalize on, saying Canada should “take full advantage of the influence and resources of our 
diaspora communities and their communication networks around the world."179  
Axworthy’s beliefs about the unrealized foreign policy potential of diaspora communities 
in Canada are shared by others, such as Eddie Goldenberg, who are knowledgeable about foreign 
policy. Eddie Goldenberg was a senior policy advisor to Prime Minister Chrétien, who has been 
described as Chrétien’s "right hand man" and as the "ultimate insider" in Ottawa.180 In his book, 
The Way It Works: Inside Ottawa, Goldenberg discusses the importance of ethnic diversity to 
Canadian politics. Goldenberg specifically addresses why Canada's cultural diversity should be 
reflected at the highest level of politics, such as in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet. Goldenberg 
expresses that, "a Cabinet whose composition reflects the diversity of the country also brings a 
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perspective to decision making that unfortunately is still not present enough in the ranks of the 
senior public service."181 Like Axworthy, Goldenberg contends that ethnic diversity (in this case 
in cabinet) has unrealized foreign policy potential. He says, "They [ethnically diverse cabinet 
ministers] serve another purpose that is little known but is becoming more and more important. 
In an era of globalization, the ethnic diversity of its governments can provide Canada with an 
advantage on the international stage."182 Thus, both Axworthy, an elected politician, and 
Goldenberg, a political advisor, recognize the importance of Canada’s diversity and lament the 
unrealized foreign policy possibilities.  
Like Axworthy and Goldenberg, Paul Heinbecker realizes the centrality of Canadian 
diversity to contemporary Canadian politics, especially in Foreign Affairs. Heinbecker was 
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's chief foreign policy adviser until 1992, when he became 
Canada’s ambassador to Germany, where he focused on NATO’s response to the Bosnian War. 
In 1996, he became Assistant Deputy Minister for global and security policy. Heinbecker was 
crucial to the creation of Canada’s human security agenda, which was invoked during the 
Kosovo War. Heinbecker headed the interdepartmental taskforce which met daily to review 
Canada's participation, both military and diplomatic, during the Kosovo War. Consequently, 
Heinbecker is well acquainted with Canada’s foreign policy priorities, issues in the Balkans, and 
Kosovo. In his book Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Handbook for Canada 
Heinbecker presents his vision for the future of Canadian foreign policy and assesses past 
Canadian foreign policy matters. It is evident in Getting Back in the Game that Heinbecker, like 
Axworthy and Goldenberg, believes in the central role Canadian diversity plays in Canadian 
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politics and foreign policy. He advocates the benefits of diverse politicians and diplomats 
representing Canada on the world stage. The importance Heinbecker places on ethnic diversity 
and Canadian foreign policy is evidenced in the second of five principles that he presents to 
guide Canada’s foreign policy: "serve Canadian unity, respect the diversity of our population, 
and privilege neither founding nation nor any province, ethnic group, economic interest, or 
religion."183 Heinbecker is wary of the Canadian government "tailoring foreign policy to suit the 
desires of diasporas."184 He argues that "the Liberals, especially, had scarcely been indifferent to 
the international interests of Canada's many ethnic groups."185 Heinbecker realizes Canadian 
foreign policy should advance Canada's interests while also reflecting its values, including those 
of its diaspora. However, he strongly advocates that the Canadian foreign policy agenda "has to 
be much more than the sum of departmental interests, provincial ambitions, and diasporas' 
aspirations."186 Thus, Heinbecker, Axworthy, and Goldenberg all recognize the centrality of 
diaspora groups to Canadian foreign policy, a view also shared by Bill Graham.  
Bill Graham was an international lawyer who became a Liberal Member of Parliament in 
1993. During the Kosovo War, he was the chair of the SCFAIT. He served as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs for the Liberals from 2002 to 2003. Much of his book, Call of the World: A 
Political Memoir, reflects how deeply related international and domestic politics are, as 
evidenced by his chapter “All Geopolitics is Local.”187 The central role immigrants play in 
Canadian politics is recognized by Graham when he states that, “many immigrants saw every 
issue from an international dimension.”188 Graham discusses what he calls “diaspora politics” in 
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Call of the World. What it comes down to, according to Graham, is that those who migrate to 
Canada become voting citizens and “import the debates that are current in their homelands.”189 
According to Graham, the diversity of Canada and his constituents personal knowledge and 
experiences effected him deeply in politics, law, and his personal life.  
As evidenced above, the importance of Canada’s diaspora communities to Canadian 
foreign policy is recognized by both politicians, policy experts, and international lawyers. 
Axworthy, Goldenberg, Heinbecker, and Graham all praise Canada’s diversity as one of its 
distinctive features, with the potential to help advance Canada’s foreign policy interest. 
However, they all caution that the influence of diaspora communities and Canada’s growing 
multi-cultural makeup also has disadvantages. Axworthy explains that diaspora groups are 
strategic when it comes to politics, “they often align themselves with members of Parliament 
from the constituencies where they are strongly represented, and increasingly use the political 
party nominating systems to gain access and influence."190 Whereas Axworthy discusses 
diaspora groups aligning themselves with political parties, Heinbecker discusses what happens 
when political parties align themselves with diaspora groups. He warns that courtship of diaspora 
communities for political gain can turn into pandering "undermining some of the basic tenets of 
our foreign policy in the process and damaging our international reputation."191  
Another drawback of the increasing advocacy of diaspora communities is that there are 
instances when Canadian politicians mistakenly believe that the diaspora concerns reflect those 
of their countries of origin. For example, the Canadian government passed a resolution to 
recognize the Armenian genocide, supported by Armenian-Canadians and opposed by Turkish-
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Canadians. Graham recalls this event in his book and asked, “What jurisdictional concern did 
Canada have about something that happened in present-day Turkey in 1915? None, but a large 
group of Armenians who had migrated to Canada were now voting citizens, and they wanted 
their MPs to acknowledge this tragedy from their past.”192 Axworthy recalled meeting the 
Foreign Minister from Armenia a few weeks after passing the resolution and telling him what 
Canada had done. Axworthy remembered that the Armenian Foreign Minister looked at him 
“quizzically and said that was nice, but Armenia was more interested in immediate support from 
Canada in its struggle to survive as a newly independent state."193 Another example of the 
greater passion within diaspora communities than within those in their homeland can be seen in 
the case of Ukrainian-Canadians. As Axworthy describes, “the Ukrainians in Canada tend to be a 
lot more hawkish than the Ukrainians in Ukraine. In terms of being anti-Russian ... they reflect a 
mindset that they or their family brought with them."194 Thus, diaspora communities in Canada 
play both advantageous and disadvantageous roles when it comes to influencing foreign policy 
and their motives must be treated with caution. As will be further explored, this was certainly the 
case with the Serbian-Canadian diaspora during the Kosovo War. The Serbian-Canadian 
diaspora brought with them to Canada extremely strong opinions and the mindset of their 
homeland. This had advantages and disadvantages during the Kosovo War.  
What is evident, from the consensus of these former politicians and policy experts, is the 
deep connection between domestic issues and Canadian foreign policy decision making. The 
domestic issue, the ethnic makeup of constituencies in Canada, is recognized by Axworthy, 
Goldenberg, Heinbecker, and Graham as being influential enough to impact foreign policy. The 
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dynamics of the relationship between diaspora communities and their influence are complicated. 
On the one hand, there is the potential for worthy causes to be brought to Canada’s attention that 
otherwise might have been overlooked. The personal knowledge and experience of diverse 
Canadians, both as constituents and as personal representatives, can advance Canada’s image and 
position on the world stage. On the other hand, some diaspora communities, such as the 
Albanian-Canadian community in 1999, are not big enough to make an impression on Canadian 
politicians and, consequently, on Canadian foreign policy. In addition, when Canada has 
conflicts with another country, domestic politics become complicated if diaspora communities 
have uncompromising attitudes. Diaspora communities know their potential for influence and 
court political parties. This can lead to political parties pandering to diaspora communities. What 
is even more complicated is when courting political parties to influence foreign policy does not 
work. Despite the strength of influence, sometimes Canada’s interests and a diaspora 
communities’ interests do not line up. This is all to say, the influence of diaspora communities on 
Canadian foreign policy is unquestionable. However, the dynamics are complicated. By 1999, 
Canada had plenty of experience juggling diaspora communities and foreign policy. By the 
Kosovo War, Canada even had plenty of experience handling the Serbian-Canadian diaspora 
specifically. However, when the Kosovo War started, all of these dynamics of diaspora relations 
came to a head in a unique way.  
Different this time around: Serbian-Canadian Diaspora in 1999  
The close ties between Yugoslavia and Canada as a result of diaspora communities 
became shockingly apparent during the Kosovo War. Serbians in Canada did not only have 
ideological, historic, and familial ties to their homelands; rather, some of them were directly tied 




with his three brothers, was in the process of getting his Canadian citizenship in 1999. Bogoljub 
was the son of a minister in Milošević’s war cabinet. A Maclean's article titled "Knocking on the 
Door: Ottawa opposes citizenship for a Milosevic crony" recaps an interview with Karic at his 
mansion in Toronto.195 The article describes the telephone "ringing steadily" during the interview 
and says many of the phone calls were from Karic's father in Belgrade. They were permanent 
residents of Canada since 1993; however, the Kosovo War complicated their plans for 
citizenship.196 The day after Maclean’s published their article on Bogoljub, the issue came up in 
the House of Commons when Bloc Québécois Member of Parliament, Daniel Turp, expressed 
frustration at Chrétien’s refusal to freeze the Canadian assets of close collaborators of Milošević. 
Turp stated, “I would therefore like to submit a very concrete case, that of Bogoljub Karic, a 
Serbian minister, who owns a television station in Yugoslavia, three companies in Canada, and a 
luxurious home in Toronto.”197 Turp then asked, “Does the Prime Minister not think that, by 
freezing the assets of this man, who is propagandizing for Milosevic and against NATO, Canada 
would be taking concrete action to step up the pressure on the Milosevic government?”198 The 
Karic brothers were not the only Serbians in Canada with direct ties to the political system in 
Yugoslavia. Graham says one of his constituents that contacted him regularly to furiously 
complain about Canada’s involvement in Kosovo was the daughter of a former Prime Minister of 
Serbia.199 Graham did not say whether this constituent still had familial political ties in 1999. 
Regardless, the actions of family members of Serbian politicians living in Canada shows how 
complicated diaspora communities make the political process, especially during times of war.   
 
195 Tom Fennel, "Knocking on the Door: Ottawa opposes citizenship for a Milosevic crony," Maclean's 112, no. 18, 
May 3, 1999, 34. 
196 Ibid.  
197 Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 135 (1997-99): 14673. 
198 Ibid.  




By the time Kosovo was on Canada’s agenda in the 1990s, protesting was already old hat 
for the Serbian-Canadian community. In the previous decade, Serbian-Canadians had protested 
Canada’s foreign policy towards (and especially their recognition of the independence of) 
Macedonia, Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia. The Serbian-Canadian reaction to Kosovo was 
different for a few closely related reasons. First, during the previous Yugoslav wars there was a 
voice to counter the Serbian-Canadian advocacy. In the words of Austin, during the previous 
Yugoslav wars “there were all kinds of struggles, they weren’t violent struggles, but there were 
two communities who were on opposite sides of the war in Bosnia.”200 A similar point was made 
by Graham, who “has no recollection” of Albanian advocacy during the Kosovo War.201 He 
observed that when the Canadian House of Commons passed a resolution in favour of 
recognizing the Armenian genocide it enraged the Turkish community but was strongly 
supported by the Armenian community.202 According to Graham, the Canadian government had 
to balance the opinions of two very strongly opinionated communities. During the Kosovo crisis, 
there was only one side. However, as reflected by Graham, Axworthy, and the primary sources 
this one side was intensely passionate. 
The second reason the Serbian-Canadian reaction to Kosovo was different was different 
is because, as explained in the preface, Kosovo played an integral role in the creation of the 
Serbian national narrative. U.S. diplomat James Pardew, who had negotiated with Milošević 
during multiple Yugoslav crises commented, "Kosovo was different. Milosevic was not the 
manipulative leader looking for a solution as he had been at Dayton. He knew that Kosovo was 
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rapidly leading to war with NATO and seemed resigned."203 The role of Kosovo in the Serbian 
national narrative, and Milošević’s unwavering commitment to Kosovo, influenced Serbian 
Canadian attitudes towards Kosovo. The April 5th, 1999 issue of Maclean’s was largely 
dedicated to covering the Kosovo War. One of the articles quotes a taxi driver in Serbia saying, 
"I don't like Milosevic very much ... but when it comes to Kosovo, we are united."204 The same 
article describes a couple in Serbia who "firmly refuse to blame the bombing on Milosevic" and 
quotes the mother passionately asserting, "the greatest thing for Serbs is to have a son, but I will 
be happy if he goes to fight in Kosovo, even if we become a second Vietnam."205 These quotes 
clearly illustrate the central role Kosovo played in Serbian nationalism, and that as Pardew notes, 
“Kosovo was different.” This type of rhetoric was mirrored by the Serbian community in 
Canada. In another article, a Serbian Canadian in Vancouver asked journalist Peter C. Newman, 
"Don't you remember June 28, 1389?"206 The man went on to explain to Newman The Battle of 
Kosovo and said, “To us, it's holy ground. To bomb and machine gun Serb soldiers won't make 
much difference. Their places will be taken by their grandfathers and their teenage children. Ours 
is that strong a culture. We shall never surrender."207 This is a pertinent example of one of the 
defining qualities of a country of immigrants. Immigrants become fully fledged citizens and 
bring many things with them to Canada, including their national identity, national narratives and 
national myths. The Kosovo War was different for the Serbian-Canadian community because of 
the central role Kosovo played in the national narrative of their homeland. 
 
203 Phillips, 99-100. 
204 Tom Fennell, "United in Rage", Maclean’s 112, no. 14, April 5, 1999, 32. 
205 Ibid., 33.  





The third reason that Serbian-Canadian reaction to Kosovo was different, was the 
effectiveness of Serbian propaganda from overseas. A common theme in the literature on the 
Kosovo War is discussing the astounding ability of Milošević’s propaganda to influence the 
west. According to Axworthy, "he understood much better that in this kind of conflict soft power 
could be an invaluable tool, while the rest of us had to learn on the job."208 The propaganda was 
deemed so important that one of the main objectives for NATO, for which a special task force 
was created, was “[n]eutralizing the internal media and other components of the Milosevic 
propaganda machines."209 Neutralizing the propaganda coming from Belgrade would be an 
uphill battle as they were already running a successful campaign in the west. Axworthy 
comments in his book: “I recall my distress at watching an extensive CNN interview with Arkan, 
a Serb paramilitary leader who was denouncing NATO attacks against civilians. The report never 
mentioned that he had already been indicted as a war criminal for his notorious killing of 
civilians in Bosnia […] the openness of Western media was not reciprocated."210 It was not only 
CNN, Canadian news media company CTV also aired a long interview with Arkan.211 Axworthy 
was right to be shocked that Arkan, an accused war criminal and military leader of a country 
Canada was at war against, was given airtime on Canadian and American television. 
Additionally, the Yugoslav government had perfected a system which would distribute a 
constant stream of reports highlighting NATO bombing indiscretions in Canada. According to 
Axworthy, "they were a staple for consumption by the people of Serbia."212 Civilians were 
targeted in a Yugoslav campaign that sent emotional emails calling for an end to the bombing to 
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ten thousand Canadian inboxes.213 The concerns over Yugoslav propaganda infiltrating Canada 
was well-founded. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the 19 April, 1999 issue of Maclean’s. 
In the same issue where there is an article warning of the effectiveness of Yugoslavia’s cyber 
warfare tactics, there is a section that presents six emails from Serbians in Yugoslavia. The 
emails are prefaced with a note that states, "These emails, though unconfirmed factually, vividly 
demonstrates how individuals are increasingly using the Internet to bypass traditional sources of 
information [emphasis added]."214 Publishing emails that are unconfirmed factually, even with a 
warning, during a “cyber war” with rampant propaganda was a questionable decision on the part 
of Maclean’s. In his book, Virtual War, Canadian journalist Michael Ignatieff argues that 
Milošević’s propaganda was so effective it could even turn the opinion of Canadians against 
their government: "Milosevic could afford to lose military assets because he was not fighting 
NATO in the air, he fought NATO on the airwaves. Propaganda has been central to war since the 
dawn of democracy, but it took an authoritarian populist from the Balkans to understand the 
awesome potential for influencing the opinion base of an enemy, by manipulating real time news 
to his own advantage."215 What can be understood from Ignatieff and Axworthy’s explanation of 
the effectiveness of Serbian propaganda is that the west was specifically targeted. If, as Ignatieff 
says, the propaganda was so effective it was capable of “influencing the opinion base of an 
enemy”, in this case Canada, it would most definitely have influenced Serbian-Canadians.  
The final, and related, reason Kosovo was different for the Serbian-Canadian community 
compared to previous Yugoslav wars was that western involvement during Kosovo was more 
intense. Serbian-Canadians were unhappy with Canada’s participation in an unarmed peace 
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keeping force in Bosnia, and with the subsequent recognition of Bosnian independence. 
However, they were livid at Canada’s participation in the bombing of their homeland, often due 
to fears for the wellbeing of their loved ones. In one newspaper article, a Serbian-Canadian is 
quoted saying that, “"I love Canada. But now I hate being here and watching the Canadian 
military bomb my brothers and sisters who are still in Serbia."216 Substantial media coverage in 
Canada focussed on Serbian-Canadians who felt similar fears and told stories of trying to ensure 
the safety of their families over seas. Axworthy and Graham were sympathetic to the concerns of 
the Serbian-Canadians. Axworthy notes: “I did not take a lot of umbrage at the protestors, I 
thought that they had a point of view.”217 Graham explains: “they [Serbian-Canadians] were very 
raw about it ... they are Canadians and they had a right to have their point of view, so I respected 
that.”218 Despite their sympathy over the concerns of Serbian-Canadians, they were steadfast in 
their conviction that the Kosovo War was justified for humanitarian reasons. “What happened in 
Rwanda led me inexorably to my decision to support military intervention in Kosovo launched to 
stop what had become a massive case of ethnic cleansing of the majority Muslim population", 
says Axworthy.219 In the House of Commons, the Minister of National Defence, Art Eggleton, 
made an impassioned speech in which he stated: “We are there because we are trying to stop a 
humanitarian disaster. We simply cannot allow evil to take over and good people do nothing. We 
must in fact ensure that this genocide comes to an end."220  
Convicted: Canadian Government Response 
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The raw emotions and the fears of Serbian-Canadians were not enough to convince 
Axworthy or Graham of the Serbian-Canadian point of view. Conversely, Serbian-Canadians 
were not convinced of the other side’s point of view. For Serbian-Canadians, either the 
humanitarian concerns were not enough to relieve them of their personal concerns for their 
homeland, or they simply did not believe that there were humanitarian concerns in the first place. 
This is clearly illustrated in a TVO debate between a representative from the Serbian National 
Shield Society in Canada, Daniel Dostanić and an Albanian-Canadian, Ahmet Jakupi, not 
affiliated with any organization. In this interview, the Serbian-Canadian repeatedly denied any 
wrong doing by Milošević or the Yugoslav government. The journalist read a report of Kosovo 
Albanians being gunned down by Serbian paramilitaries and asked Dostanić, “when you hear 
reports like that, what do you think?” to which Dostanić replies emphatically, “I think they’re 
false!” The interviewer said in exasperation, "we have absolutely divergent views on what's 
going on" before wrapping up the interview.221 Frustration over Serbian-Canadian denial of the 
facts is expressed by Axworthy when he comments that, “What was most distressful was a 
general unwillingness amongst Serbian Canadians to face the fact of the Milosevic government’s 
campaign to ethnically cleanse Kosovo.”222  
The reason neither Graham nor Axworthy ever questioned the Canadian position on 
Kosovo, despite the adamant protesting of their Serbian constituents, is because of the high 
quality of intelligence Canada had. Graham had firsthand knowledge because he had been sent 
by Chrétien to assess the situation early on. After visiting the refugee camps in Macedonia, 
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seeing burnt and bombed buildings in Kosovo, and talking to humanitarian aid workers on the 
ground, Graham returned and reported to caucus that something had to be done.223 Graham 
reflects on his visit and remembered that, “I reported back to caucus of my conclusion and I 
don’t like to use the word genocide because of the legal import that it has under the genocide 
convention, but it was. It certainly was a form of ethnic cleansing.”224 Other members of 
parliament also went to survey the region on their own accord. Graham remembers being 
surprised when he ran into NDP MP Svend Robinson at a refugee camp in Macedonia.225 
Axworthy says that, although he was sympathetic to the outcry from Serbian-Canadians, he 
trusted the quality of Canada’s intelligence. He recalls that, “we had a lot of sources of quite 
verifiable information.”226 According to Axworthy, this included intelligence sharing networks 
such as the Five Eyes Alliance and also Canadian sources intelligence. “We had a very active 
effort, on our own, in terms of getting intelligence out of Serbia,” Axworthy asserts.227 The 
Canadian government and its Serbian citizens were at a stalemate on the issue of Kosovo. 
Despite the Canadian government’s clear commitment on Kosovo, a combination of a lack of 
Albanians, Serbian nationalism, Yugoslav propaganda, and fear for loved ones emboldened the 
Serbian diaspora in their protests. More so than during the previous Yugoslav wars.  
Petitions, Personal Pleas & Protests: Serbian-Canadian Reaction 
Both Graham and Axworthy had adverse experiences with Serbian protestors. Axworthy 
writes in his memoir that there were “personal attacks and allegations against many of us in the 
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government about our motives, suggesting this was a plot against the Serbian people."228 In some 
cases things escalated drastically. Axworthy tells of one incident when he recalls that, "I was out 
on a bicycle ride with my family when a number of Serb Canadians who had been demonstrating 
on Parliament Hill turned ugly with both verbal abuse and physical threats."229 Although he 
understood the depth of their feelings and their loyalty to their homeland, “it was not the kind of 
experience you want to share with your wife and son” Axworthy says.230 Axworthy was 
particularly frustrated that the Serbian-Canadian demonstrators protested outside his home in 
Ottawa.231 Graham’s memoir details a strikingly similar incident, when he recalls that, “during 
the bombing of Kosovo, I was threatened by a group of angry Serbs who showed up at my 
annual MP's picnic in a Cabbage town park."232 Graham had to get used to being called all sorts 
of names instead of what he preferred which was "a back-and-forth gentlemanly debate."233 
Graham understood part of politics meant dealing with opposing views; however, he emphasizes 
that, "one thing I did not like was being grabbed and abused by irate constituents."234  
Axworthy’s residence was not the only house at which Serbian-Canadians were making 
their voices heard: they were making their voices heard in the House of Commons as well. One 
of the ways Serbian-Canadians were garnering attention was through petitions sent to their 
Members of Parliament. On 25 May, 1998, the Member of Parliament for Kitchener-Centre 
presented a petition signed by 114 “constituents of Serbian descent” asking the government to 
“take action in reaching a peaceful solution to the Kosovo crisis.”235 Another petition, presented 
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on 10 June, 1998, by the Member of Parliament for Kitchener-Waterloo, on behalf of 
constituents of "Serbian descent," called upon the government to "take all necessary action to 
stop all forms of armament into Kosovo and Metohija.236 237 This petition presumably meant the 
arming of the KLA. The next day, on 11 June, 1998, the Member of Parliament for Ottawa West-
Nepean presented a petition on behalf of Canadians of Serbian descent "calling attention that the 
actions of the Canadian government with regard to Serbia are in their view non-democratic."238 
The petitioners asked that, “the House of Commons consider the best interests of all citizens of 
Serbia for peace and democracy in the Kosovo region."239 This petition is important because it 
represents the turn from petitioners advocating action on Kosovo to becoming critical of the 
Canadian government. On this same day, the Member of Parliament for Toronto Centre–
Rosedale presented a petition regarding Kosovo.240 On 28 October, 1998, the Member of 
Parliament for Niagara Falls presented a petition that was given to him at the celebration, in his 
riding, for the 53rd Serbian Day. According to Hansard, "the petitioners, a large number for 
Niagara falls, are calling upon this House to consider very carefully the situation that is 
developing presently in Kosovo."241 The circumstances surrounding this petition highlight the 
realities of diaspora communities in Canada, as analysed above. On Serbian Day, a day that 
commemorates The Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and which is extremely important to Serbian 
nationalism, a Canadian politician was handed a petition regarding Canada’s involvement in then 
present-day Kosovo. This illustrates how diaspora communities merge beliefs and nationalism 
from their homelands along with their pasts, and the political system in Canada in the present, in 
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an attempt to ultimately influence foreign policy. When petitions proved ineffective, Serbian-
Canadians political intervention progressed to personal pleas.  
 When Canada’s commitment in Kosovo progressed to participation in the 78-day NATO 
bombing of Yugoslavia, Serbian-Canadians’ commitment to having their voices heard in 
Parliament progressed as well. Canadian Members of Parliament across the country were 
inundated with phone calls and personal visits from Serbian-Canadian constituents. Often these 
phone calls and visits were accompanied by harrowing stories and passionate pleas. On 12 April, 
1999, the Member of Parliament for Burnaby-Douglas, Svend Robinson, spoke to the House of 
Commons about the effect hearing from both Serbian-Canadians and Albanian-Canadians had on 
him and stated, "It was brought home to me when a Serbian constituent phoned. He said 'How do 
I explain to my daughter that her government, the Government of Canada, is bombing her 
grandmother's home?"242 Robinson said that within a couple of hours he heard from a "Kosovar 
Albanian living in Canada who said that he was unable to contact his parents. Silence. He has no 
idea. There is fear and uncertainty in not knowing what is happening to them."243 The first 
notable thing about the experience Robinson described is that he heard from both sides. The vast 
majority of Members of Parliament, who mention hearing from constituents in their office, only 
mention hearing from Serbian-Canadians. It is also worth noting the terminology Robinson uses.  
When discussing Serbian-Canadians, he says “Serbian constituent”. Whereas, when discussing a 
phone call from the Albanian, Robinson uses the term “Kosovar Albanian in Canada.” This 
could imply that the Serbian caller was a Canadian citizen and the Albanian caller was not. In 
that case, the weight and concerns of citizens have more potential to influence politicians and 
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consequently foreign policy (more so than that of non-citizens). Robinson ends by asking: “We 
have to ask the question: What do we do now? How do we answer these anguished questions of 
our constituents and, indeed, of Canadians?”244 On the same day, Jean Augustine, the Member of 
Parliament for Etobicoke—Lakeshore, asked, “how do I respond to so many of my constituents 
who in the main are eastern European, many of them from Serbia? How do I speak to them about 
this issue at present?”245 Members of Parliament who supported Canada’s involvement in 
Kosovo for humanitarian reasons were increasingly concerned with how to respond to Serbian-
Canadian constituents in their ridings.  
How did Members of Parliament respond to desperate pleas from their own constituents 
that their families were in danger and that they were ashamed of being Canadian? According to 
Axworthy, with understanding, transparency, and firmness. First, Axworthy was understanding 
of Serbian-Canadians and empathized with them. He goes so far as to say that, “legitimate 
questions were raised by representatives of the Serbian community", but does not specify which 
questions he is referring to.246 Axworthy’s understanding that Serbian-Canadians had legitimate 
questions and concerns convinced him of the need for transparency on the part of the Canadian 
government. This meant that Axworthy, with Members of Parliament with large Serbian-
Canadian communities in their constituencies (such as Hamilton cabinet minister Sheila Copps), 
consistently met with groups of Serbian-Canadians to hear their concerns and explain Canada’s 
position.247 According to Graham, other than meetings, nightly televised hearings with the Chief 
of Defence Staff, General Ray Henault, and Jim Wright, the Director General for Central, East, 
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and South Europe at DFAIT, were held for the sake of transparency.248 The policy of 
transparency that the government adopted was the direct result of the Serbian-Canadian 
community. Axworthy explains that the decision to hold a daily press briefing was to "counter 
the criticisms coming via Yugoslav media or from critics inside Canada, especially the Serb-
Canadian community, who opposed Canadian intervention."249 Therefore, the government of 
Canada went to great lengths to respond to Serbian-Canadian concerns with both understanding 
and transparency. The voice of Serbian-Canadians was heard loudly enough that it influenced 
what the Canadian government’s media policy was during the Kosovo War. However, in 
addition to understanding and transparency, the government responded with firmness. According 
to Axworthy: “we made an effort to reach out and connect but at the same time we had to say 
look we’re trying to establish a principle that you have to intervene at certain periods in order to 
protect the human beings who are being risked.”250  
However, not all Members of Parliament were as firm as Axworthy and Graham. Some, 
like the Member of Parliament for Scarborough-Agincourt, Jim Karygiannis, passionately 
defended the Serbian-Canadian position and admonished his colleagues. In a lengthy reproach on 
12 April, 1999, he stated: 
A lot of members came here today pretending that they know the history of 
Bosnia. Well, to my honourable colleagues who pretend that they know the 
history of Bosnia, to my honourable colleagues who have travelled to 
Yugoslavia and to Kosovo and who say they know the Balkan history, I say to 
them that they have another thing coming. That part of the world has been in 
turmoil not for the last 50 years and not for the last 100 years, but we should say 
for the last millennium. Since history has been recorded, that part of the world 
has had atrocities done on both sides by all kinds of people. The atrocities 
happening there have been by both sides. It is not something new. I can quote 
text and verse from 50 years ago, from 100 years ago, from 200 years ago, the 
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history of what has happened in that part of the world. It was the Ottoman 
empire. Before that there was the Byzantine empire. Before that was the Roman 
empire. For my honourable colleagues who say that they know about Balkan 
history because they have visited Bosnia, I say go read the history and do not be 
ignorant.251 
What is important to note is that Karygiannis references the same historic conflicts that the 
Serbian-Canadian diaspora reference when claiming sovereignty over Kosovo. As mentioned in 
the first chapter, these events are shrouded in so much nationalist mythology, by both Albanians 
and Serbians, that little can be factually confirmed about the events. For Axworthy and the 
government of Canada, ancient, ethnic hatred could have no part in the conversation in the face 
of present human rights abuses. However, history continued to come up in the House of 
Commons, as constituents continued to bring it up in phone calls with their Members of 
Parliament. For example, on the same day Karygiannis lectured his colleagues on history, Paul 
Szabo the Member of Parliament for Mississauga South, told the story of “a Serbian gentleman 
[who] came to my office and gave me quite a lecture about the centuries of history of the area. 
His basic conclusion was that it was their turn, that many Serbians had died over the years and 
that they had to get even. It was as bald as that. It was their turn to kill somebody.”252 The reality 
of diaspora politics in Canada meant that debates over history going back further than Canada 
had even existed continued to come up in discussion in the House of Commons.  
After admonishing his colleagues on the shortcomings of their historical knowledge, 
Karygiannis then read multiple emails he received from Serbian-Canadian and Russian-Canadian 
constituents opposing Canada’s involvement in Yugoslavia. This illustrates an important aspect 
of diaspora politics; that is, like countries, diaspora groups also have allies. During the Kosovo 
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War, the majority of the opposition was coming from the Serbian-Canadian community; 
however, they were also aided by the Russian-Canadian and Greek-Canadian communities. The 
Russian and Greek communities were connected to the Serbian community by their shared 
Orthodox faith. Karygiannis himself came to Canada as an immigrant from Greece. It is 
impossible to say for certain whether this influenced how he approached the issues in Kosovo. 
That said, it is worth noting that, as previously discussed, foreign policy experts such as 
Goldenberg emphasize how diverse cabinet members are influenced, for better or for worse, by 
their homeland communities. The same could be said for Members of Parliament. Canada’s 
approach to Kosovo was not only complicated by the Serbian-Canadian, Greek-Canadian, and 
Russian-Canadian cultural communities: other communities also capitalized on the events to 
further the interest of their homeland communities. For example, the Tamil community used 
Canada’s involvement to protect Kosovo-Albanians as an opportunity to request Canada’s 
protection of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils sent a 
letter for Foreign Minister Axworthy that says, “that the civil war in Sri Lanka not only predates 
the Kosovo conflict by more than a decade, but also has claimed many more lives, more than 75 
000.” They argued that “just like the Albanians fleeing the Serbian onslaught, over 700 Tamils 
fled when the Sinhalese army, after a bloody military campaign, occupied the Jaffna 
peninsula.”253 Thus, when Canada makes foreign policy decisions, it must consider both the 
diaspora communities that will be directly affected and the diaspora communities that will not, 
but will argue for the precedents being set to be extended to their own homelands.  
 




A part of Karygiannis’ lengthy address to the House of Commons on 12 April, 1999 was 
reading the content of a petition with 15,000 signatures he said he had received: 
We the undersigned residents of Canada draw to the attention of the House the 
following: that the Canadian government is blindly following the careless and 
dangerous U.S.-NATO policy of bombing the sovereign country of Yugoslavia 
and the Serbian people; that such policy sets dangerous precedents and could 
only open the door for foreign intervention in internal affairs of nations of 
minorities; and, that violence will not resolve the Kosovar problem but rather it 
facilitates the further entrenchment of the forces on both sides. We do not want 
to see the residents of Kosovo live in peace and harmony.254 
 
The text of this petition illustrates a few important factors in the Serbian-Canadian diaspora’s 
attempts to influence Canadian foreign policy. The phone calls and emails contained personal 
anecdotes and references to historical events. The petitions, in contrast, focussed on making 
arguments around foreign policy and potential precedents, as well as warning Canada of the 
consequences of their actions. It is worth noting that this petition was never formerly presented 
to the House of Commons. In his address to the House of Commons, Karygiannis, mentions that 
he “seem[s] to be the focus for e-mails and have received over 8,000 in the last week or so” and 
even received an email from somebody in New York.255 Members of Parliament quoting 
Canadians who directly called or visited their constituency offices is completely valid. Those 
Members of Parliament were elected to represent and voice the concerns of their constituents and 
were doing so. However, quoting from 9000 emails received without verifying the content (or 
that they were even from Canadian citizens) is problematic. This is especially so when it was 
well-established that the Yugoslav government was conducting a cyber war by spamming the 
email inboxes of journalists, citizens, and politicians in NATO countries, as noted by Ignatieff 
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and Axworthy earlier. This is not to say that none of the emails Karygiannis received were from 
Canadians. It does, however, illustrate how the presence of diaspora communities complicates 
foreign relations, especially during a cyber war. It also raises the question of why Karygiannis, in 
his own words, “seem[s] to be the focus for emails.” As Axworthy warns: “they [diaspora 
groups] often align themselves with members of Parliament from the constituencies where they 
are strongly represented.”256 With all of this said, Jim Karygiannis, a Liberal Member of 
Parliament, never voted against Canada’s actions in Kosovo.257  The lobbying of Members of 
Parliament by diaspora communities had both notable successes and limitations.  
Public Reaction 
It is also important to understand the successes and limitations of the lobbying of 
Canadian public opinion by diaspora communities. On 27 April, 1999, Reform Member of 
Parliament for North Vancouver, Ted White, said in his address to the House of Commons that 
other than from Serbian-Canadians he has heard very few opinions, “despite the serious nature of 
the issue.”258 White describes being surprised that when monitoring a radio talk show they did 
not pick up a single call regarding Kosovo and concluded that, "it would seem that the average 
person on the street considers it too far away and something that is not important enough to 
worry about. I receive more letters about the taxes families are paying and the difficulties with 
the immigration system or justice issues than I receive about the situation in Kosovo."259 Polling 
at the time challenges White’s concerns that the lack of radio phone ins from Canadians equates 
to apathy or ignorance to what was happening. In an Environics poll conducted in May 1999, a 
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sizeable majority of Canadians claimed to have followed the conflict attentively.260 What more 
likely explains the lack of feedback from non-diaspora Canadians is the overwhelming support 
for the mission. Constituents are more likely to write when they disagree with something than 
when they agree with it. In early April 1999, a Compass poll showed that 79% of Canadians 
supported NATO's actions and 72% approved Canada's involvement.261 Even more significantly, 
over half, 57% of Canadians, favoured sending ground troops, something that politicians were 
very hesitant to do.262 Other polls, such as a survey by Angus Reid, support the accuracy of these 
results. The Angus Reid survey shows that two-thirds approved NATO's actions and Canada's 
participation and 60% would approve the use of ground troops, if necessary.263 As the war 
progressed, public support fell slightly, but public approval continued to be in the majority at 
57%.264 In addition to petitioning the government directly, influencing public opinion was 
integral to Serbian-Canadian’s attempts to influence foreign policy during the Kosovo War.  
Serbian-Canadians tried to influence public opinion through media and public protests. 
The Toronto Star's "Letter of the Week," for 3 April, 1999, was written by a Serbian-Canadian 
who asked, "[h]ow is my mother to blame for the policies of [Slobodan Milosevic]?"265 The 
author stressed that not all Serbians agreed with Milošević. However, other letters to the editor, 
such as the one found in Maclean’s April 12th issue, illustrate that many did. The letter to the 
editor is from a Serbian-Canadian and reads: "I am deeply ashamed that the Canadian 
government sent its military forces to Yugoslavia [...] To me, it is mind boggling that NATO 
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attacked my country without a UN Security Council resolution. My heart goes to my family and 
friends and I completely understand Milosevic's rejection of an agreement that nobody has 
seen."266  
These letters to the editor were published alongside articles about passionate protests by 
Serbian-Canadians in Canada and around the world. On 28 February, 1999, Serbian-Canadians 
gathered in front of U.S. consulate in Toronto to protest the peace initiatives at Rambouillet. The 
protestors held up U.S. flags with swastikas and signs that said, “U.S. Policy Cleanses Serbs.”267 
Three weeks later, on 23 March, 1999, when Canada announced its participation in Operation 
Allied Force, Serbian-Canadian protests erupted around the country. The protests took place in 
cities across Canada, but the one in Toronto was especially noteworthy. The second night of 
protests turned violent when demonstrators hurled rocks and eggs at the U.S. consulate in 
Toronto. According to one Toronto Star article, “more than 1,000 people -- many of them Serbs 
with young children in tow -- gathered in front of the consulate, shutting down University 
Ave.”268 At this protest, a police officer, a police horse, and several other first responders were 
hit by rocks. Four protestors were arrested. The crowds sang Serbia's national anthem while 
chanting "Hey, hey U.S.A., how many Serbs have you killed today?"269 The article describes 
how hard it was for first responders: "When fire officials tried to get through the crowd to put out 
a large fire created by [burning] flags and other debris, they were pelted with eggs."270 Protestors 
called Canadians fascists, killers, and terrorists. One Serbian-Canadian is quoted as saying, 
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"What's a little vandalism? Our (Canadian) forces are committing murder."271 The next week's 
issue of Maclean’s included a photo of two heavily armed guards in front of the burning and 
vandalized U.S. consulate in Toronto.272 The week after that, Maclean’s included a photo of 
protestors burning a Canadian flag with a swastika drawn on it.273 In response to these protests, 
the Member of Parliament for Verchères-Les-Patriotes, Stéphane Bergeron, expressed sympathy, 
“I would also say that a degree of sympathy can be felt for the Serbian demonstrators throughout 
the world, including here in Canada and Quebec […] It is understandable that seeing their 
country attacked in this way may indeed awake in them a certain nationalistic pride…”274 
However, his sympathy was not enough to convince him: “While we can sympathize with these 
protesters, while we deeply care for peace, it is absolutely out of the question not to act, to stand 
idly by while terrible things are going on in Kosovo.”275  
While Members of Parliament in the House of Commons expressed understanding, the 
court of public opinion was much less sympathetic. Many letters to the editor during the Kosovo 
War supported Canada’s involvement. However, even in a letter to the editor where the writer 
does not support NATO’s bombing, the writer expressed frustration at Serbian-Canadian protests 
and asked, "As for the protests of Serbs in Canada, where were they when their brethren were 
ethnically cleansing the Bosnian Muslims?"276 In contrast to Axworthy, who admits there are 
drawbacks to the phenomenon of dual loyalty but emphasises the benefits instead, many 
Canadians were much less optimistic. The week after Maclean’s published the letter mentioned 
previously, in which a Serbian Canadian says, “"I am deeply ashamed that the Canadian 
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government [...] NATO attacked my country […]” Maclean’s received a letter directly 
responding to this writer from another Canadian.277 In her response, the author writes: "I have 
been amazed by the number of Serbian landed immigrants - and Canadian citizens - who feel so 
free to express their shame and discontent with a country they now call home. They chose to live 
here over their native land for a reason, but they refer to the NATO attacks taking place in their 
country. Which is it?"278 The writer goes on to say that she does not, “think the Canadian people 
are as concerned with the reasons behind the attacks as much as they are with helping all those 
poor refugees. After all, they are the innocent victims in all this, no matter who wins or loses."279 
Requiring Canadians to choose where their loyalty lies during a time of turmoil and criticizing 
them for concerns over their homeland is unfair. However, legitimate questions were raised by 
those expressing anger at the Serbian-Canadian demonstrators. As Bergeron said, referring to 
Serbian-Canadians, it was “understandable that seeing their country attacked in this way may 
indeed awake in them a certain nationalistic pride.” Similarly, seeing Canadian flags burnt, and 
the suffering of Kosovo Albanian refugees was enough to awaken in Canadians nationalistic 
pride and humanitarian concern. 
One letter to Maclean’s particularly expressed the frustration Canadians felt with their 
Serbian co-citizens: 
I am confused by Canadian-Serbs who are angry because of Canada's 
involvement in Kosovo. So what if Kosovo has been part of Serbia for 900 
years? I thought human beings were beyond this petty state in their evolution. It 
angers me to see a picture of a protester burning a Canadian flag with a swastika 
inside the Maple Leaf ('Outrage in Kosovo, Cover, April 12). Who is involved in 
ethnic cleansing here? Is that not similar to what Hitler did to the Jews before 
and during the Second World War? It is time for Serbs to take a look in the 
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mirror. Are they proud the Serbian military and police are responsible for killing 
thousands of ethnic Albanians?280 
 
This letter illustrates a few important aspects of the Canadian public’s reaction. First, Serbian-
Canadian protests angered the public instead of sparking sympathy for their cause. Second, the 
Canadian public was not interested in debates surrounding historic events, they were interested in 
contemporary suffering. Finally, like Axworthy and the Canadian government, the support of the 
Canadian public was motivated by the human rights abuses happening against Kosovo 
Albanians.  
If the purpose of the protests was only to vent their frustrations, the Serbian-Canadians 
were successful. More likely, the purpose of the protests was also to influence public opinion, 
and consequently influence foreign policy towards Canada. In this case, the protests were 
unsuccessful. One Toronto Star article opens with, “The growing rage of the Serbian diaspora, 
including Serb Canadians, against the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia is understandable. […] 
However, a more pressing matter for the majority of the protesters is this: Have they ever paused 
to ponder what it is that they may be defending?”281 The article continues, “Slobodan Milosevic? 
His ethnic cleansing?”282 The author is critical of Serbian-Canadians “deafening silence on one 
of the most moral issues of our time.”283 Following the protests, Canadians asked tough 
questions of their Serbian-Canadian counterparts. In an article titled, “Serb protests against 
Canada ring hollow”, the author criticized the sudden “concern” of Serbian-Canadians about 
peace in Kosovo saying, “Maybe had they started protesting their government's slaughtering of 
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civilians in Kosovo, they may have had a positive impact on what Slobodan Milosevic was doing 
to the Kosovars.”284 Public opinion continued to favour Canada’s involvement even as Serbian-
Canadian’s vented their frustrations. 
The Albanian-Canadian community capitalized on the bad publicity and public 
frustration Canadians were expressing over Serbian-Canadian actions. Following the Serbian-
Canadian protests, the president of the Albanian Canadian Community Association of Toronto, 
Halit Hoxha, said that Albanian-Canadians were planning their own demonstration. Making 
obvious reference to the Serbian-Canadian protests, he emphasized: “We're not throwing stones 
or eggs. We'll be throwing flowers."285 On 3 April, 1999, the Albanian-Canadian community 
held this gathering in front of Queen’s Park with the intention “to thank Canadians for their 
military, monetary and moral support of Kosovar refugees.”286 As at the Serbian protests, there 
was a large police presence. Unlike at the Serbian-Canadian protests, there was no violence and 
the signs mostly thanked Canada. People held signs which read, "Stop the genocide," "Thanks 
for your support NATO," and "May sanity prevail," as well as photos of Albanian-born Mother 
Theresa captioned "Kosovo needs your blessing."287 Demonstrators sang the Canadian national 
anthem and chanted "Free Kosovo."288 The demonstration was also much smaller, with roughly 
300 people. Hours later, 1500 Serbian demonstrators began to gather for the eleventh day and 
were met by 250 members of the RCMP and the Toronto Police Services prepared for any 
escalation.289 While the demonstrations missed each other by only a few hours, the communities 
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clashed in different ways. For example, after the previously mentioned TVO debate between a 
Serbian-Canadian and an Albanian-Canadian, the participants and their friends got into a 
confrontation behind the scenes. The Toronto Star described the confrontation this way: "behind 
the polite face of Canadian multiculturalism, emotions are running high…" and said that when 
the cameras turned off the confrontation was so intense security had to be called.290 The clashes 
between the two cultural communities went beyond verbal confrontations. In some cases, there 
was violence. An apartment in Toronto, where multiple Albanian-Canadian families lived, was 
vandalized with ethnic slurs and the words “Serbia will never surrender, and Muslim Albanians 
die.”291 A fire was also lit in the lobby of the building. The Albanian-Canadians interviewed in 
the news article describing these events said that they previously called the police when their 
children were threatened in school over the NATO bombing.292 Of course, not all of the protests 
were violent, there was peaceful protests by Serbian-Canadian communities across Canada, 
including in Montreal, Ottawa, and Edmonton. However, the frustrations of the Serbian 
community, and the perceived threats of violence were strong enough that it affected decisions 
the Canadian government made, especially those dealing with the Armed Forces.  
Policy Impact 
 As previously mentioned, during the Kosovo War, the Canadian government prioritized 
transparency and held daily press briefings. According to Axworthy, the protests of the Serbian-
Canadian community were one of the factors that led to transparency being a top priority, and 
consequently the briefings were televised.293 However, the Canadian government’s transparency 
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had its limits, which was also caused by the Serbian-Canadian community. During the Kosovo 
War, the Canadian Forces’ media policy prevented pilots, except in rare exceptions, from being 
interviewed, and banned the use of identifiable information. The 5 April, 1999 issue of 
Maclean's was dedicated mostly to Canada's participation in the Kosovo War. According to one 
of the articles, pilots were banned from interviews. The reason for this was explained as being 
due to the fact “that the Canadian military authorities are worried about the possibility of 
reprisals back home, sparked by the same emotions that prompted Canadians of Serbian descent 
to mount angry demonstrations in Toronto last week."294 In the rare case pilots were allowed to 
give interviews their backs were to the camera.295 This policy was the cause of great 
consternation among the media; however, according to the Canadian government, it was 
necessary to keep the members of the Canadian Armed Forces and their families safe.296 At the 
daily briefing on 20 April, 1999, Brig. Gen. David Jurkowski explained the media policy banned 
the following: interviews, pictures, and any footage with the faces, names, and hometowns. 
Basically, nothing that could identify individual servicemen and women was allowed. Jurkowski 
explained: 
We had learned some lessons during the Gulf War and some of those lessons 
relate to threats back to families back at home—telephone calls, harassing 
telephone calls, body bags on the lawns of wives and kiddies back home in 
Canada and of individuals who were found to be operating in the Gulf. We 
learned those lessons and until there is a proper moment to be more open with 
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Canadian historian Bob Bergen is extremely critical of this media policy in his book Scattering 
Chaff: Canadian Air Power and Censorship During the Kosovo War. According to Bergen, there 
is no evidence that missions would have been compromised by such media access, and the policy 
was damaging to democracy and to the pilots themselves. However, what is important to 
understand is that, at the time, the venting of frustrations by the Serbian-Canadians led policy 
makers to genuinely believe there was risk of reprisals in Canada. In effect, this meant that the 
diaspora community directly influenced foreign and military policy during the Kosovo War.  
Conclusion 
 If Canada had a larger Albanian-Canadian presence in the 1990s, would Canada have 
advocated for intervention in Kosovo sooner? Would Canada have advocated for the use of 
ground forces? It is impossible to say for certain. What is evident from an analysis of the primary 
sources is that, at the very least, diaspora communities complicated decision making during the 
Kosovo War. At the very most, they directly influenced foreign policy decisions. As time passes 
and documents from the Kosovo War become declassified, historians will get a clearer sense of 
the true extent to which diaspora communities impacted foreign policy. As Axworthy states, 
"The role of the ethnic diaspora, as I've said, increasingly influences Canadian foreign policy 
decisions, and this was certainly the case in Kosovo. [emphasis added]”298 That said, the fact that 
Canada continued its actions in Kosovo, despite the size and impact of its Serbian-Canadian 
diaspora, proves the depth of Canada’s conviction towards Kosovo. An analysis of the Kosovo 
War proves how domestic issues, such as the cultural makeup of the country, impact foreign 
policy decision making. The inextricable ties between domestic and foreign issues were not only 
 




understood by the Serbian-Canadian diaspora, they were understood by Serbians living in 
Yugoslavia as well. This is evidenced by the words “Republic of Quebec,” which were 
prominently sprayed in graffiti on the vandalized Canadian Embassy in Belgrade.299 Diaspora 
communities were not the only domestic factor that preoccupied Canadians during the Kosovo 


















CHAPTER IV: SOVEREIGNTY SENSITIVITY 
" Canada has had a string of long-lived prime ministers of Quebec origin - Trudeau, Mulroney, 
and Chrétien - all of whom were exquisitely cognizant of these attitudes and, of course, all too 
aware of the independantiste attitudes in Quebec, ebbing and rising with events and the years. If 
it is bad policy to let Canadian Jews or Muslims have undue influence on policy to Israel, it is 
similarly bad policy to let Quebec, or any one province, determine Canadian defense and foreign 
policy." 
- J.L. Granatstein, "Multiculturalism and Canadian Foreign Policy" in The World in 
Canada: Diaspora, Demography, and Domestic Politics 
 
"Republic of Quebec." These words were painted onto the damaged Canadian Embassy 
in Belgrade after a night of Serbian protests against NATO's intervention in Kosovo.300  
A month prior, and a half a world away, across the Atlantic Ocean, a Serbian-Canadian protester 
in Toronto asked journalists, "How would you feel if Quebec decided they wanted to get out of 
the federation? And the U.S. bombed the Canadians for trying to keep their own land? How 
would you feel?"301 In Macedonia, a resident in a Serbian village refused to speak to a Canadian 
journalist and said "Come back when you let Quebec go free and I'll talk to you!"302 Another 
villager from the same community said that “Canada is just the same as America" after accusing 
the journalist of smelling like an Albanian.303 Were these accusations apt? Did Canada have no 
right to get involved in Kosovo unless they “let Quebec go free”? Was Canada “just the same as 
America”? No, these accusations were not correct. However, they did reflect an understanding of 
two sensitivities present within Canadian society and tried to capitalize on them. First, Canada’s 
sensitivity when dealing with sovereignty issues around the world due to its own sovereignty 
issues at home. Second, the accusation that Canada is merely a follower of the United States and 
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does not have its own distinct foreign policy. As to the first sensitivity, scholars have been quiet 
when it comes to the Kosovo War. Because there was broad consensus about the humanitarian 
and regional stability concerns in Kosovo, scholars have paid sparse attention to other 
considerations in the foreign policy. These same scholars have been pre-occupied with 
distinguishing Canada’s contributions from that of their NATO allies, most importantly the 
United States, militarily and democratically. An analysis of the primary sources reveals that 
Canada did in fact have an additional and unique consideration during the Kosovo crisis: national 
unity.  
Canada’s domestic national unity issue influenced Canadian foreign policy towards 
Kosovo at every stage. First, concerns over national unity were front and centre during Brian 
Mulroney’s time as Prime Minister. It was during this time concerns over Kosovo first came to 
the attention of the Canadian government. It was also during this time the precedent for 
comparing Kosovo and Quebec was set. In addition, national unity continued to be a crucial 
concern during Chrétien’s time as Prime Minister. It was during this time, from 1995 to 1999, 
that issues in Kosovo went from being on the government’s radar to being the central issue in 
foreign policy through the Kosovo War. Finally, despite the Canadian government’s attempts at 
minimizing the issue, the Canadian public, parliamentarians, and journalists continued to 
compare Kosovo and Quebec.  
Separatism & The Mulroney Years 
Brian Mulroney never mentions Kosovo in his book Memoirs: 1939-1993. Yugoslavia is 
mentioned only a few times: once, to mention that his wife is Serbian and the remaining six 
times to briefly mention that Yugoslavia was on the agenda. Not unsurprisingly, Quebec and 




separatist forces in Quebec. This is evidenced by the letter he wrote Prime Minister John 
Diefenbaker as a young law student warning of separatism’s rise in Quebec. In this letter, 
Mulroney advocated for preventative action to be taken, such as official bilingualism, a Canadian 
diplomatic appointee to the Vatican, and the creation of a national flag.304  Part of the platform 
on which Mulroney was elected Prime Minister was national unity. He advertised himself as the 
one who could bring Quebec into the constitution. Mulroney was true to his platform and 
national unity was a central goal during his tenure. In pursuit of this goal, and under Mulroney’s 
leadership, the Meech Lake Accord was signed by the premiers of all ten provinces in 1987. The 
proposed amendments to the constitution under the Meech Lake Accord included increased 
provincial power over immigration, provinces nominating senators and Supreme Court justices, 
provinces having a constitutional veto, and, importantly, Quebec being recognized as a distinct 
society. When the changes were not ratified by all ten provinces by the 23 June, 1990 deadline, 
Mulroney’s first major attempt at constitutional change and securing national unity failed. The 
demise of Meech Lake meant that the accord had the opposite of its intended effect on national 
unity. Residents of Quebec felt alienated and support for separatism rose leading to the creation 
of a federal separatist party on the national stage, the Bloc Québécois. The original coalition that 
formed the Bloc Québécois was led by Mulroney’s former cabinet minister, Lucien Bouchard. 
Mulroney’s second attempt at national unity through the creation of a constitution that all 
provinces, especially Quebec, had signed was similarly ill-fated. The Charlottetown Accord of 
1992 granted more powers to the province, addressed Indigenous self-government, reformed the 
Senate and the House of Commons, and importantly, like the Meech Lake Accord, recognized 
Quebec as a distinct society. Unlike the Meech Lake Accord, the Charlottetown Accord was 
 




voted on by Canadian citizens in a referendum. Again, residents of Quebec felt slighted and 
support for separatism rose. This led to the Bloc Québécois gaining seats in the House of 
Commons and becoming the official opposition by the 1993 federal election. Thus, national 
unity and rising separatism in Quebec was one of the chief concerns during the Mulroney 
government, as it would be for Chrétien. 
The most obvious way separatist concerns manifested themselves during the Mulroney 
government was through his repeated attempts at constitutional reform. However, the presence of 
these concerns also influenced foreign policy. Paul Heinbecker was Mulroney’s chief foreign 
advisor and described by Mulroney as "meticulous, effective and loyal in every way." In his 
book, Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Handbook for Canada, Heinbecker gives 
numerous examples of ways Quebec, and relatedly, separatism, influenced Canadian foreign 
policy throughout history. For example, article ii of the founding treaty of NATO, known as "the 
Canadian article" which promoted political, economic, and social co-operation among members 
was insisted upon by Canada. According to Heinbecker, it was "evident that the government in 
Ottawa wanted the clause in order to show Quebecers that there was more to NATO than 
military commitments."305 Heinbecker realizes the crucial importance national unity plays in 
Canadian foreign policy. This is evidenced in the second of five principles that Heinbecker 
presents to guide Canada’s foreign policy: "serve Canadian unity, respect the diversity of our 
population, and privilege neither founding nation nor any province …”306  He also argues that the 
Canadian government’s attention to world affairs is deeply affected by Canada’s domestic 
national unity concerns.307 Thus, during the years Brian Mulroney was prime minister, national 
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unity was a top concern domestically, and consequently influenced foreign policy, including 
toward Kosovo.   
Kosovo & The Mulroney Years 
The issue of Kosovo’s desire for independence had long been on the radar of Canada’s 
then Department of Foreign Affairs. The groundwork for the domestic concern about national 
unity being applied to foreign policy was laid during Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s time in 
office. The 1990 issue of the journal of the then Department of External Affairs, International 
Perspectives, included an article titled, “Can Canada be a Role Model for a Changing Europe?” 
In this opinion piece, Louis Balthazar, a professor of political science at Université Laval, asked, 
“How can Yugoslavia manage to hold together in the race of the multitudinous national forces at 
work in Kosovo, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia?”308 Balthazar argues that federalism is the 
only real option, and that Canada cannot support sovereignty in other nations. Balthazar 
described Canada as a “country with distinct allegiances, a ‘community of communities,’ a 
confederation” and argues that as such Canada “could serve as an interesting model for the world 
of tomorrow.”309 Thus, Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs can be said to have advanced 
thinking that compared the national unity issue in Canada to separatist tensions in other parts of 
the world, including Kosovo.  
The first ever mention of Kosovo in the House of Commons was during a discussion on 
Croatia’s potential independence from Yugoslavia on 18 November, 1991. While discussing a 
majority ethnic population’s right to self-determination, New Democratic Party Member of 
Parliament Svend J. Robinson mentioned the suffering of Kosovo Albanians: “We know that the 
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Albanian majority in Kosovo has been brutally repressed for too long. Our obligation as 
parliamentarians is to recognize that we must in the absence of leadership from this government 
provide leadership on behalf of the people that we have the honour to represent.”310 Robinson did 
not connect the right to self-determination in Yugoslavia to the national unity issue in Canada. 
However, Liberal Member of Parliament Christine S. Stewart did, and she did not mince her 
words. Stewart accused the Canadian government of allowing a deplorable situation to continue 
out of self-interest: 
Today we have all these innocent people within Yugoslavia who are suffering so 
much personally and it appears that those who have power to change things in 
the world are not prepared to take the necessary steps or do not have the political 
will to bring about a peaceful resolution to the problem that exists. Sovereignty 
sensitivities in this area have translated into inaction. This is unacceptable. 
Young people, students, men and women who have learned over years, mind 
you under a stern dictatorship, to live together. [emphasis added]311  
 
Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament Alex Kindy was even more direct when he 
responded to, and disagreed with, Barbara McDougall, his own party’s Secretary of State for 
External Affairs. During his response on why Canada should recognize Croatia’s independence, 
Kindy read a quote from an article in The Financial Post which called the unravelling of 
Yugoslavia “almost a mirror image of Canada and therefore Canadian politicians think 
Quebecers might identify too much with the nationalists of the republics.”312 This means that 
from the very beginning of Kosovo being on the government’s radar, so was Quebec separatism.  
This discussion in Parliament reveals important information about the motivations at the 
time. To begin, it reveals that the first time the issue of Kosovo was mentioned in Parliament was 
in the context of self-determination, even if the main discussion was about Croatia. Next, it 
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illustrates how the potential independence of states in the Balkans was compared to Quebec. 
Relatedly, it reveals that parliamentarians understood one of the motivating factors in the 
government’s foreign policy was the consideration of national unity in Canada. Finally, it 
illustrates that national unity had an influence on Canadian foreign policy. This influential 
presence was evident in Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative government 
as well as in the Liberal government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien.  
It was not just parliamentarians who made a connection between the breakup of 
Yugoslavia and Quebec’s desire for separation: major Canadian newspapers published articles 
with similar comparisons. On 31 August, 1991, The Globe and Mail published an article called 
“Quebec's eyes light up at republics' rush to independence.” In this article, journalist Lysiane 
Gagnon argued that secession in Yugoslavia will add fuel to the “independantiste” movement. 
However, she concluded that “what happens on the domestic front is what will shape Quebec’s 
political mood. The real threat to national unity does not lie in Eastern Europe, but in Canada.”313 
Gagnon may have concluded that secession in Yugoslavia will not be the deciding factor in 
Quebec separatism; however, the Canadian government was nervous about any influence on the 
national unity issue. Two weeks later, Jeffrey Simpson’s article, “If Canada followed the 
Communists, things might not stop at Quebec,” in The Globe and Mail commented on this 
nervousness: 
Croats and Serbs fight in Yugoslavia. Macedonians declare their independence 
from the Yugoslav federation. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo province resent their 
domination by Serbs. Another ethnically divided federation splits asunder. 
Despite all the evident differences between these federations and Canada, the 
obvious question remains: is their fate ours? Not the fighting part, but the 
breakup of a federal state into ethnic entities? The nervousness this question 
 





necessarily arouses explains the cat's paws on which External Affairs Minister 
Barbara McDougall tip-toed through Kiev, the Ukrainian capital.314  
 
This mention of Kosovo among countries vying for independence crucially illustrates that 
Kosovo’s potential independence was already on the radar of journalists, as well as that of 
politicians. This article illustrates how the national unity question was understood to be 
influencing the actions of Canadian parliamentarians.  
 On 15 January, 1992, Canada recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia from 
Yugoslavia, and then recognized the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 8 April, 1992. 
At first glance, the recognition of these three former Yugoslav republics suggests that Canada’s 
foreign policy on separation was changing. However, Canada was still operating with a healthy 
dose of sovereignty sensitivity. For Kosovo, this meant that Canadian policy towards separation 
remained unchanged. After years of being mentioned alongside ethnic, nationalists, and 
separatist struggles in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Canadian government 
had to explain why the policy towards the remaining movements was different. On 9 March, 
1993, a press release by the Secretary of State for External Affairs explains that although they 
were aware of other parties in want of recognition, “Canada plans no action, however, that could 
contribute to further destabilization of the region.”315 This press release does not specifically 
mention Kosovo’s desire for independence. It does, however, mention Macedonia. It states that 
“Canada's position with regard to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is that its people 
have a legitimate claim to recognition.”316 Thus, Canada’s position was that they would not 
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destabilize the region, even if they agreed a republic had a legitimate claim to recognition. 
Official government documents, such as this one, emphasized that Kosovo was a province of 
Yugoslavia.317 It is likely that because Kosovo was never a republic in Yugoslavia that Canada 
assessed their claims to independence as less legitimate.318 Thus, when Prime Minister Chrétien 
was elected, and the Liberals took over the Department of External Affairs and International 
Trade, comparisons between Kosovo and Quebec were already prevalent and Canada’s foreign 
policy dictated discouraging any separatist movements. 
Separatism & The Chrétien Years  
 Like Mulroney, Chrétien’s tenure as prime minister was marked by rising separatist 
concerns and preoccupation with Quebec. Chrétien, a French-Canadian politician who had been 
active in campaigning for the ‘non’ side during the 1980 Quebec Referendum, came into the 
office of Prime Minister in 1993, with years of experience dealing with separatism. A year after 
Chrétien took office, in 1994, Jacques Parizeau, the leader of the sovereigntist Parti Québécois 
was elected Premier of Quebec and announced that there would be another referendum on 
Quebec sovereignty. On 30 October, 1995, the referendum was held and the “non” side won by a 
very narrow margin of 50.58 per cent. This victory was too close for comfort for the Canadian 
government and the Chrétien government became fixated on national unity issues for the rest of 
its tenure.  
 The Canadian government’s fixation on sovereignty was not just a domestic issue; rather, 
it influenced foreign policy as well. This is noted by the policy advisors and politicians closest to 
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Chrétien. James Bartleman was Chrétien’s chief diplomatic advisor from 1994 to 1998 and 
assistant secretary to the cabinet for foreign and defence policy in the Privy Council Office. In 
his memoir Rollercoaster: My Hectic Years as Jean Chretien's Diplomatic Advisor, 1994-1998, 
Bartleman admits that he was Chrétien’s advisor for less than half of his time in office and he 
"cannot comment as an insider on the big foreign-policy challenges that came up in his 
remaining years, in particular the Kosovo and Afghanistan military campaigns"319 Nonetheless, 
Bartleman gives valuable insight into the foreign policy priorities and effect of separatist 
concerns. Bartleman comments on the central role sovereignty concerns played in Chrétien’s 
foreign policy: “I am in no position to comment on the policies he adopted to counter separatists 
at home. Internationally, however, I was a witness to his actions to ensure that they gained no 
international support for their cause."320 Bartleman does not specifically mention Kosovo, but he 
does comment on the tie between separatist concern and international policy. He says there was 
concern about separatism in regards to "other multi-ethnic countries" including Yugoslavia.321 
The understanding that national unity was the primary domestic concern for the Canadian 
government is shared by policy advisors such as James Bartleman and politicians such as Lloyd 
Axworthy and Bill Graham. Axworthy and Graham were both closely involved with foreign 
policy in Chrétien’s government and are described by Chrétien as members of his “A team.”322 
As members of the “A team,” they were acutely aware of Chrétien’s priorities. Both Axworthy 
and Graham contend that national unity was the paramount consideration in decision-making. 
Axworthy explains that the role of the foreign minister meant “serving one master, the prime 
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minister.”323 However, he specifies that unlike Mulroney, Chrétien gave his ministers, including 
his ministers of foreign affairs, a “fair amount of latitude.”324 One of the “prime ministerial lines 
that one didn’t cross,” however, was national unity.325 Although the issue of national unity is 
principally a domestic concern, Axworthy was expected to apply foreign policy to this issue that 
was “closely watched by the PMO.”326 Graham’s assessment of the Chrétien government’s 
priorities are similar as he explains that the government was fixated on national unity above all 
else.327 Thus, it is well established that national unity was the primary domestic concern of the 
governing Liberals, and that domestic concerns were closely related to Canada’s foreign affairs 
under Chrétien. Therefore, it is not surprising that, although never explicitly mentioned as a 
motivating factor, an analysis of primary sources reveals that domestic concerns over national 
unity continued to influence Canada’s foreign policy towards Kosovo. 
Kosovo & The Chrétien Years 
By the time Prime Minister Chrétien and the Liberals came into power, the media, 
politicians, and the newly rechristened Department of Foreign Affairs, had already established a 
precedent for comparing the breakup of Yugoslavia to national unity issues in Canada. During 
these years, Kosovo was a part of the comparison but was overshadowed by more pressing issues 
in the Balkans. During Chrétien’s time as prime minister, the Kosovo issue escalated to the point 
that Canada needed a specific policy to deal with it. Even when Kosovo was seen as its own 
issue, the Liberals continued the trend of comparing the crisis there to the national unity crisis at 
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home. An analysis of the primary sources from 1993 to 2000 shows how the domestic concern of 
national unity was a factor in Canada’s foreign policy towards Kosovo more than ever.  
Kosovo was at the top of the agenda at a Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade roundtable on the Balkans held on 31 March, 1998. Speaking on the topic of “Albania and 
Kosovo” was Dr. Robert Austin. Austin was a research associate with the Titan Group for Public 
Policy Analysis, a professor at the University of Toronto, and the Albania analyst for CBC News. 
He was one of the leading experts in Canada in the 1990s on Albanian issues. The memorandum 
sent to Axworthy after this meeting summarized Austin’s position as being that “[the] solution is 
not necessarily autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia but incremental growth of human rights ... 
dealing with political rights at a later time.”328 The two policy recommendations given to 
Axworthy, written by Austin in the following months, continued to emphasize that a decision on 
Kosovo’s status should be delayed. The first, from April 1998, explained that the main cause of 
the Kosovo crisis was that Kosovo’s political status was “ambiguous” with both sides having 
“reasonable claims to the territory.” The report stated: 
Nearly all parties in the Balkan region and international community are treating 
the Kosovo conflict as a question of political status: Should Kosovo remain a 
region of the Serbian Republic within Yugoslavia, regain its status as an 
autonomous province within Serbia, become a republic within Yugoslavia or 
achieve independence as its own state?329  
 
Austin believed that the international community was unanimous in its support for greater 
autonomy while categorically opposing independence.330 However, the report warned that both 
sides, Serbians and Kosovo Albanians, would be categorically opposed to greater autonomy for 
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Kosovo in Yugoslavia. The report concluded that Canada should “get the issue of Kosovo's 
political status off the table for the time being” and instead focus on human rights and 
security.331 Austin’s report in the fall of 1998 concluded the same: “Before any progress can be 
made in resolving Kosovo's political status, the basic human rights and democratic rights of the 
Albanian community must be assured.”332 Canada’s foreign policy towards Kosovo did follow 
the recommendations in these reports. Canada delayed commenting on a preferred political 
solution for Kosovo, while making it clear that they did not support independence.  
The policy recommendations presented to Axworthy stated that Canada’s interest in 
Kosovo were based on security and human rights issues. The recommendations did not mention 
Canada’s national unity interests playing a role. The recommendations did state that Canada’s 
role as a country where “politics of compromise are commonplace” gave Canada a unique and 
relevant perspective.333 This can be understood as alluding to Canada’s compromises 
surrounding its own issues of national unity.  
When asked about the connection between national unity concerns in Canada and foreign 
policy in Kosovo Austin, the author of these reports, conceded that the Canadian government 
sometimes "fell into the trap" of comparing Kosovo and Quebec.334 Austin is clear that he 
resented comparisons being made between the two saying "it [Kosovo] had nothing to do with 
Quebec by the way." According to Austin, the comparison between Quebec and Kosovo "was 
always an overstated argument, more or less used by Belgrade."335 Although some bought the 
arguments that Kosovo opened a "pandora's box" when it came to separatist concerns, Austin 
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never did. Austin felt strongly that "to compare Canada and Quebec was absurd."336 He believed 
that any comparisons were baseless; despite this, he admitted that comparisons were common in 
journalism, academia, and especially Serbian diplomatic circles. He explained: “the Quebec link 
was put there by people who didn’t get it or who were trying to make the story relevant for 
Canadians.”337  
While Austin now admits comparisons of Quebec and Kosovo were present, the 
government documents he wrote do not make the comparison outright. While government 
documents alluded to, but did not specifically mention, Canada’s national unity issues, the media 
and politicians continued to draw comparisons between Canada’s national unity and Kosovo. An 
April 1998 article in The Globe and Mail, titled “Kosovo and the Americans,” criticized the 
American government and the international community for considering supporting Kosovo’s 
independence. The article opens with the comparison between Canada and Serbia: “This is a 
mistake. Kosovo is as much a part of Serbia as Quebec is of Canada. No Serbian president could 
let it go and survive.”338  
On the evening of 7 October, 1998, the House of Commons held a special debate on the 
situation in Kosovo. In his opening remarks, Axworthy outlined Canada’s position on Kosovo’s 
political status. He stated, “It is very clear. Canada and the communities must reject terrorism as 
a means of obtaining independence for Kosovo. We have stated clearly that the solution for 
Kosovo is independence within Yugoslavia. No peace is possible in the Balkans if the borders 
can be changed by force.”339 The Reform Party’s lead foreign affairs critic Bob Mills responded 
by pressing Axworthy on potential independence and reminded him, “That is what Kosovans 
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want.”340 Bloc Québécois Member of Parliament Daniel Turp stated that he agreed that there was 
a lack of clarity on Canada’s position and again brought up the question of independence: 
Reform Party members were right to point out that we do not have here, this 
evening, concrete indications on the measures that Canada favours … We are 
told that these measures seek a diplomatic solution to the problem. This is fine, 
but what specific measures? What would be Kosovo's status within or outside 
the Yugoslav Republic? We should consider any solution that respects the 
wishes of the Kosovo people.341  
 
In response to the discussion, New Democratic Party Member of Parliament Gordon Earle stated 
that, “the federal NDP affirms and recognizes the right of self-determination for the people of 
Kosovo to decide their own political future”342 While other Members of Parliament were 
pressing Axworthy on Canada’s position on independence in Kosovo, Progressive Conservative 
Member of Parliament David Price was the first one to directly compare Quebec to Kosovo 
when he said that “it is certainly a difficult dilemma between self-determination and not breaking 
up countries. If only it could be as simple as pointing to Canada as a beacon of how two distinct 
peoples can live together with only occasional debate and heart ache ... if only Milosevic listened 
to reason the way the people of Quebec and the people of Alberta listen to reason.”343 Ultimately, 
despite pressure from members of all the other parties in the House of Commons, the Liberal 
government would not clarify its position on Kosovo’s potential independence and right to self-
determination.  
From 6 February, 1999 to 22 March, 1999, the Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo was 
held in France to find a solution to the escalating crisis in Kosovo. While these discussions were 
being held between the Contact Group and Yugoslavia, Canadian politicians continued to make 
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points about Kosovo’s independence and comparisons to Quebec in the House of Commons. On 
17 February, 1999, Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament David Price argued that the 
“lack of Liberal clarity has left Canadians wondering what is the government's policy on 
Kosovo.”344 Bloc Québécois Member of Parliament René Laurin took the lack of a Canadian 
position as an opportunity to argue in favour of recognizing Kosovo. Laurin emphasised that 
“independence for Kosovo must be seriously considered rather than simply dismissed.”345 His 
party colleague, Paul Crête, similarly stated, “We must give thought to the possibility of 
recognizing the independence of Kosovo rather than writing off the idea, because it could be one 
of the solutions to be explored in order to restore peace to the region.”346 These exchanges in the 
House of Commons illustrate that whether they liked it or not, Canadian parliamentarians were 
forced to consider Kosovo’s potential independence and listen to comparisons be made between 
Canada and Quebec.  
On 22 March, 1999, the negotiations at Rambouillet ended in failure when Yugoslavia 
refused to sign the accord. Two days later, Canada and its NATO allies were at war against 
Yugoslavia. As expected, during the first weeks of NATO’s bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, 
the discussions in the House of Commons centred on military actions. However, it was not long 
before the government was pressed on the issue of Kosovo’s political status. On 12 April, 1999, 
the leader of the New Democratic Party Alexa McDonough asked, “[b]ecause of the military 
focus, political solutions have been virtually ignored with 19 days of bombing but no real 
diplomatic leadership. Will the government now agree to show the leadership Canadians expect 
and push for a United Nations led negotiated solution?"347 In addition, Bloc Québécois Member 
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of Parliament Daniel Turp asked, “Could the Prime Minister tell us whether Canada intends to 
promote this solution, or will it continue reacting to events as it has been doing since the 
beginning of this conflict?”348 Like Robert Austin’s policy paper recommended a year earlier, 
Chrétien delayed taking a stance on a political solution. Instead, Chrétien stated, “At this time, 
the priority is to get an agreement, to allow Kosovars to return home. This is the top priority. 
Then, there is the issue of Kosovo's political status. Kosovo enjoyed a high degree of autonomy 
until President Milosevic took it away in 1989. What will the political solution be? We are 
prepared to look at every option.”349  
Chrétien, however, was not off the hook. Members of Parliament continued to try and 
discern what Canada’s position was. The leader of the Reform Party, Preston Manning asked, 
“Are NATO and the Canadian government still committed to the Rambouillet agreement calling 
for an autonomous Kosovo within Yugoslavia? Or is NATO and our government now inclining 
toward supporting an independent Kosovo?”350 These comments in the House of Commons, on 
12 April, 1999, illustrate two important things. First, there was pressure on the Liberals to define 
Canada’s foreign policy on the political status of Kosovo, and the Liberals avoided doing so. 
Second, the only firm position the Liberals held was that complete independence was 
unacceptable. The Canadian government had seemingly accepted Austin’s policy 
recommendation that Canada delay taking a stance on the political status of Kosovo. 
While some politicians were pressing the government on its position on Kosovo’s 
political status and getting unsatisfactory answers, others were busy drawing the comparisons 
once more. Liberal Member of Parliament Clifford Lincoln argued that Canada had the upper 
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hand in finding a solution: “given its tradition of peace and the fact that pluralism is one of its 
central policies and values.”351 While other politicians, such as the New Democratic Party’s Pat 
Martin, drew darker comparisons. Martin exclaimed, “Canada ….is at risk of being split apart by 
disparate forces. There is a western separatist party pulling it in one direction and an eastern 
French separatist party pulling it in another. As we review the turmoil in Kosovo it is good for us 
to pause to reflect on some of the lessons that can be learned”352 Bloc Québécois Member of 
Parliament Paul Mercier gave a long speech in which he compared the treatment of the Acadians 
by the British to the treatment of Kosovo Albanians by the Serbs. He concluded that “perhaps the 
lesson to be drawn from the situations in Yugoslavia and in Canada is to allow nations their own 
governments.”353 Throughout the bombing campaign, Bloc Québécois politicians continued to 
compare Acadians to Kosovo Albanians. The comments in the House of Commons on 12 April, 
1999, illustrate that even the bombing campaign could not stop comparisons between Quebec 
and Kosovo. Thus, though the Liberals did not address these comparisons, it is reasonable to 
assume that these issues played on the mind of a Prime Minister who held national unity as his 
number one priority.  
Public Opinion & Quebec Comparisons 
While the Liberals were downplaying the comparisons in the House of Commons, the 
media and public continued to debate the parallels between Kosovo and Quebec. One Toronto 
Star article titled “Could Quebec ever follow the example of Kosovo?” opened with the question, 
“It Could Never happen here, could it? As Canadians watch the human drama unfolding in 
Belgrade and Kosovo, how easy is it really to dismiss the thought that scenes of this nature could 
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one day unfold here?”354 The article described a hypothetical situation in which partition 
resolutions are adopted by Quebec municipalities, Quebecers are bombed by the rest of Canada, 
and Washington intervenes. Ultimately, the author concludes that Canada’s strong foundation in 
democracy would prevent this unlikely scenario. However, it is important to note that writings 
with such comparisons were not uncommon during the Kosovo War.  
Maclean’s received multiple letters from readers comparing Kosovo to Quebec. One 
letter critical of the Kosovo War asked “If a guerilla war were to erupt in Mexico, or between 
Scotland and Britain, or between Quebec and the rest of Canada, would NATO assemble a 
military force to bomb Mexico, England or Canada?"355 One writer to the Toronto Star who was 
concerned about the precedent Canada was setting in Kosovo asked “[s]uppose that in the not-so-
far-away future, Quebec decides to separate unilaterally from Canada. It is logical to assume that 
Canada will do everything in its power to prevent such an act. Now, suppose that the U.S. 
considers Canada's actions to be improper. Will the U.S. bomb Ottawa, Toronto, Vancouver, 
etc.?”356 A week later, the Toronto Star received a response to this letter from a reader who 
“found its comparisons of Serbia keeping Kosovo in Yugoslavia and a scenario in which Canada 
prevents Quebec from separating in a similar situation very upsetting.”357 The reader explained 
that even if Canada kept Quebec from separating “it would not create the same reason NATO is 
launching its military action in Serbia. As I recall, Serbia is systematically forcing the Kosovars 
to move and killing the ones who resist its aggression. If Canada ever did that in Quebec, NATO 
certainly would be justified in bombing to stop it, although I know that we would never do such 
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a thing.”358 Similar sentiments are found in other publications. One writer to Maclean’s stated 
she was proud of NATO's actions in Kosovo, even if they could set a precedent for Quebec, 
stating: 
Consider the unthinkable. In a Quebec referendum, 90 per cent of Quebecers vote 
to separate from Canada. Heavily armoured English-Canadian troops go 
immediately into Quebec, burn villages, towns and cities, rape women, kill the 
young men, put hundreds of thousands of Quebecers on boats to France, and 
hundreds of thousands of refugees flood the U.S. border states. Would you not 
expect NATO to intervene? That is exactly what is happening in Kosovo.359 
 
These letters illustrate two crucial points. First, comparisons between Quebec and Kosovo were 
prominent enough that the public were responding to hypothetical situations when writing to 
magazines such as Maclean’s and Toronto Star. This illustrates that sovereignty concerns were 
on the mind of average Canadians as well as politicians. Second, not everyone who made the 
comparisons believed that they were valid. The author above explicitly points out that if Quebec 
were to commit wide scale human rights abuses, she would support intervention. The assumption 
is that since there is not wide spread human-rights abuses, Canada does not need to worry. For a 
Liberal government with a healthy dose of ‘sovereignty sensitivity,’ it did not matter whether the 
comparisons with Quebec were valid or not. The existence of such comparisons themselves were 
trouble.  
On 10 June, 1999, the Kosovo War ended when Milošević agreed to the withdrawal of 
Serb forces from Kosovo, and to the presence of an armed international peacekeeping force 
made up of NATO countries and Russia. Members of Parliament from the Bloc Québécois 
immediately criticized the lack of clarity on Kosovo’s political status. As NATO’s bombing 
came to an end, so did the frequent mention of Kosovo and the political status of Kosovo in the 
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House of Commons. This is pointed out by historians of Canada’s role in Kosovo, Bob Bergen 
and Sean Maloney, as well as by the media coverage of the issue. However, the report of the 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, chaired by Bill Graham and 
released in June 2000, a full year after the Kosovo War ended, illustrated that there was still 
discontent over Kosovo’s political status. The report states that the majority of the committee 
agree that Canada’s actions were a legitimate response to the crisis in Kosovo, and that Canada 
should continue to have a presence there. The report included a supplementary opinion by the 
Bloc Québécois in which they state that they agree with the majority of the report; however, they 
also believed that no permanent resolution will be found without recognition of the right to self-
determination of the inhabitants of Kosovo: 
The Liberal government, in the grip of its Canadian unity obsession, has 
managed to forget this simple truth: people have the right to determine their 
political future. If the international community, and especially Canada, do not 
put all their influence to support this right, regional conflicts will only proliferate 
in the future. And Canada will have no one to blame but itself. [emphasis 
added]360  
 
The Bloc Québécois never directly accused the Liberals of being motivated by its own ‘national 
unity obsession’ during the Kosovo crisis. However, this damning indictment of the position of 
the Liberal government on Kosovo’s political status illustrates that Canada’s national unity was a 
motivating factor all along, and not just the humanitarian and regional stability interests they 
claimed.  
Reflections 
 When asked, two decades later, if sovereignty sensitivities had an effect on foreign policy 
in 1999 both Graham and Axworthy conceded that they did. According to Axworthy, one of the 
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reasons sovereignty sensitivity continued to influence Canadian foreign policy was because 
“there was a very aggressive effort by the government in Quebec to compete internationally.”361 
Axworthy explains that Canada’s actions were always guided by a sensitivity that we would not 
be seen as endorsing a separatist agenda internationally. This was the case for Kosovo as well. 
According to Axworthy, when decision making about Kosovo, they were “conscious” of the 
comparisons with Quebec but had to be “be very careful not to fall into the old Russian trick of 
equivalency.”362 Like the writers to Maclean’s and the Toronto Star, Axworthy believes it was a 
false equivalency: “[it] wasn’t exactly the same as what was happening in Quebec. People in 
Quebec were not being ethnically cleansed … I mean we had the FLQ crisis back in the 70s but 
it’s not comparable. So this idea of equivalency was always a problem but we always made the 
case that look what we’re doing in Kosovo was protecting people’s lives.”363 Graham agreed 
with Axworthy on the influence of separatism on foreign policy and explained: “the issue of 
Quebec, is bound to influence Canadian foreign policy and it influences domestic policy 
tremendously.”364 Graham recalled that Serbian-Canadian constituents who would phone his 
office would often ask him “how would you feel if Quebec was separating?”365 Graham 
explained that Canada had to act with extreme caution whenever “Canadians get involved in 
situations where there is a break up of a country” because Canadians are “always reminded of the 
fact that we have a Quebec situation where we are in theory not tolerant about the break-up of 
countries.” As such, the Canadian government regarded their actions in Kosovo as a very serious 
matter and proceeded with a “great deal of caution.” Graham said that “we [Canada] wouldn’t 
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have taken the steps we did unless we felt very strongly that human rights were being violated at 
a vast level.”366 Illustrating that humanitarian concerns overruled the sovereignty sensitivities the 
Canadian Government had. What further ameliorated the concerns over comparing Kosovo to 
Quebec was that Quebecers were largely in support of Canada’s actions in Kosovo. As Graham 
explained: “Quebecers as a whole were strongly in favour of a principled foreign policy 
recognizing the importance of human rights.”367 The reflections of Axworthy and Graham 
confirm what an analysis of the primary sources already revealed: Canada’s concerns over its 
own national unity affected its foreign policy and decision making towards issues in Kosovo.   
Conclusion 
 If Canada did not have domestic concerns over national unity would they have advocated 
more strongly or sooner for a political solution to Kosovo? If the Bloc Québécois and residents 
of Quebec were opposed to action in Kosovo, would Canada have hesitated to participate in 
Operation Allied Force. It is impossible to say for certain the extent to which Canada’s domestic 
concerns over national unity, its own “sovereignty sensitivities,” affected Canadian foreign 
policy during the Kosovo War. What can be said is that officially Canada’s interests in 
developing its foreign policy towards Kosovo were humanitarian and done with due regard to 
regional stability considerations. However, an analysis of the primary sources reveals the 
decision making in Canada was more complex because of its domestic concerns. Canada did, in 
fact, have an additional and unique consideration during the Kosovo crisis: its own national 
unity. Canada’s national unity issue influenced Canadian foreign policy towards Kosovo at every 
stage. As in the case of diaspora discontent, sovereignty sensitivity was a domestic issue that 
influenced foreign policy decision making during the Kosovo War. From the first time Kosovo 
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was mentioned in the House of Commons in 1992, and all the way through the Kosovo War in 
1999, issues over Kosovo’s potential independence were raised and debated. While the Canadian 
government tried to minimize comparisons between Quebec and Kosovo, they could not prevent 
parliamentarians, journalists, and the public from comparing the two. In the end, like with 
diaspora discontent, sovereignty sensitivity was not enough to outweigh the concerns over 
regional stability and human rights. This analysis shows both the unique considerations Canada 




















CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
As the Kosovo War ended, media coverage and discussion about Kosovo, both in the 
House of Commons and with the public, became increasingly sparse. Of course, when the 
Kosovo War ended, Canada’s involvement with Kosovo did not. In response to overcrowded 
refugee camps resulting from the Kosovo War, Canada initiated Operation Parasol, the airlift of 
thousands of 5051 Kosovo Albanian refugees to Canada. An additional 2266 refugees were fast-
tracked for admission to Canada under the Kosovo Family Reunification program (KOF).368 In 
addition to participating in KFOR, Canada sent correctional service advisors to Kosovo. 
Canadian Corrections advisors worked in Kosovo on a joint initiative of the Canadian 
International Development Agency and the Correctional Service of Canada.369 Many Canadian 
NGOs operated in Kosovo, and Canada participated in UNMIK in various capacities. Two of the 
most influential war crimes prosecutors dealing with the Kosovo War, Eliott Behar and Louise 
Arbour, were Canadian. Despite the continued ties between the two countries, Kosovo faded into 
the periphery. Albanian experts, such as Austin, tried to keep Kosovo on Canada’s agenda, but to 
little success. For Austin, who, during the Kosovo War, wrote policy recommendations which 
advocated postponing any decision on the political status of Kosovo, the time had come to stop 
postponing that decision. Austin wrote many newspaper articles “reminding people that 
Kosovo’s destiny was to have an independent state” and “on some occasions advised the 
government about that need.”370 For a long time, these efforts were fruitless. Canada continued 
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to defer taking a position on the political status of Kosovo as issues in Kosovo were no longer 
high on the government’s agenda.  
The time eventually came when an issue in Kosovo returned the nation to Canada’s 
agenda. On 17 February, 2008, Kosovo, with the support of the United States, unilaterally 
declared independence from Serbia. Despite its substantial role in the 1999 NATO mission, 
which secured Kosovo’s de facto independence, Canada did not follow. Within a week of 
Kosovo’s declaration, some of Canada’s major allies had recognized its independence: among 
them the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. 
Yet, Canada continued to delay. The second major time Kosovo was on the government of 
Canada’s radar, the same two domestic influences of diaspora communities and Quebec 
separatism came to the forefront again. However, things were different this time.  
The 7317 Kosovo Albanian refugees who settled in Canada following Operation Parasol 
immediately doubled the size of the Albanian diaspora in Canada. By the time of Kosovo’s 
declaration in 2008, this number had grown even further. In the 2006 census, 22,395 people 
identified as Albanian and 1530 as Kosovar.371 As before, the accurate numbers are likely higher. 
Regardless, by 2008, the Albanian-Canadian community was at least 23,925 strong: a major 
increase from the 4000 to 8000 in 1999. In 1999, Serbian-Canadians passionately protested 
Canada’s role in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, but Albanian-Canadian community lacked 
the size to make up an effective advocacy force. In stark contrast, in 2008, when Canada was 
faced with a decision over whether to recognize Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence, Kosovar Albanians passionately protested. The numbers of Albanian-Canadians 
had grown significantly and so had their potential for political influence. By 2008, enough time 
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had past that many of the Albanian refugees who had come would be both fully-fledged 
Canadians and voting citizens. As in 1999, Serbian-Canadians took to the streets to demonstrate 
and advocate for their position. Serbian-Canadians protested in cities around Canada holding 
signs that said, “Serbia Today, Quebec Tomorrow.”372 What was different about the diaspora 
pressure on the Canadian government regarding Kosovo in 2008 was that this time there were 
two sides to be heard. In the days following Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the streets of 
many major Canadian cities filled with the celebrations of Albanian-Canadians. Many of those 
rejoicing were the 7317 refugees that Canada had accepted in 1999. In the crowds in Toronto, 
many were holding signs that read “THANK YOU CANADA,” along with Canadian and 
American Flags.373 However, the Albanian-Canadians were too quick to thank Canada. In the 
days and weeks following 17 February, 2008, Canada’s major allies recognized Kosovo’s 
independence, but Canada continued to delay. To understand why it took Canada a full month to 
recognize Kosovo’s declaration of independence, one must turn back to the other domestic issue 
that influences Canadian foreign policy: national unity.  
When Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Conservative government was pressed by the 
Bloc Québécois in the House of Commons, government officials gave non-answers such as “we 
are assessing the situation” and “we will inform the house in due course.”374 While the other 
parties, especially the Bloc Québécois, relished the opportunity to hold the government’s feet to 
the fire on their position on separation, Canada was again delaying taking a position on the 
political status of Kosovo. The fact that Canada did not have a response ready to address 
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Kosovo’s declaration is all the more surprising when one considers that the government had been 
confronted with the issue of Kosovo’s political status since Mulroney was in power.  
It was not until a full month later, on 18 March, 2008, that Canada finally recognized 
Kosovo’s independence. The government was still careful to repeatedly explain the uniqueness 
of Kosovo’s situation. Foreign Affairs Minister Maxime Bernier emphatically stated, “So for us 
it's a unique case and as a declaration issues by Kosovo's parliament also makes clear, and this is 
what's important for us, the unique circumstances which have led to Kosovo's independence 
mean it does not constitute any kind of precedent.”375 In 2008, Daniel Turp, who had pushed the 
Liberals on the political status of Kosovo in 1999, and continuously made comparisons to 
Quebec, had moved to provincial politics and was now the Parti Québécois’ international 
relations critic. In response to Canada’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence, he stated, 
“Canada is recognizing a country, a new country, although the country it was part of disagreed. 
That is something that is new. We're happy that that has happened.”376 Neither the statement of 
Daniel Turp nor that of Maxime Bernier mentions Quebec separatism directly. However, one can 
easily infer they are alluding to Quebec. Serbia’s Ambassador to Canada, Dušan T. Bataković, 
did not “beat around the fleur-de-lis” in the same way. After Serbia withdrew Bataković from 
Canada in an act of diplomatic outrage, he directly invoked the status of Quebec within Canada 
when he asked, “Can you imagine, for instance, if the Quebec parliament declared its unilateral 
independence the same way the Kosovo parliament did? Would they recognize, in Ottawa, 
Quebec as an independent country or not?”377  
 







Why did Canada’s foreign policy diverge from that of its major allies when Kosovo 
unilaterally declared independence on 17 February, 2008? An analysis of the primary sources 
reveals that the government of Canada’s fear over the political status of Kosovo, and its potential 
independence, was caused by the frequent comparisons between Kosovo’s struggle for 
independence and that of Quebec’s struggle for sovereignty; that is, Canada’s own national unity 
issue. These comparisons were used by the Serbian-Canadian diaspora to try to influence 
Canadian foreign policy every step of the way. Canada’s own domestic national unity issue and 
diaspora pressures were a continual influence on Canadian foreign policy towards Kosovo. 
Consequently, Canada delayed taking a stance on Kosovo’s political status. However, they could 
not delay forever. 
Officially, Canada’s interests in developing its foreign policy towards Kosovo were 
humanitarian and regional stability considerations. These were shared with rest of its NATO 
allies. As such, on the surface, it would seem that Canada and its NATO allies had similar 
concerns during the decision-making process around Kosovo. Digging deeper, an analysis of the 
primary sources reveals that Canada did, in fact, have a set of additional and unique 
considerations during the Kosovo crisis, namely national unity and diaspora discontent. This 
analysis, in turn, amply illustrates how interconnected domestic issues and Canadian foreign 
policy are. During the Kosovo War, Canada had to balance the interconnected domestic 
pressures of diaspora relations and national unity with their humanitarian concerns. 
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